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1947

PALESTINE

Fine No. 9373

to pp. 11428

1978

61960

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Reference:-

FO 371 / 61960

2

1947

E

E 94.1

10 OCT.

PALESTINE

Registry
Number

FROM

No.

Dated

Received
in Registry

E 94.1/9373/31

40.

Minute

W. Burrows

10 Oct

Withdrawal from Palestine.
Effect on Transjordan.
Discusses future of Transjordan, in respect
of strategic position, use of Arab
Legion, & Transjordan frontier forces,
etc in connection with possible withdrawal
from Palestine.

Last Paper

9373

References

E 974 8/30/80

(Print)

(How disposed of)

Off. Group - Captain
Hartley,
Cabinet Offices
from Mr Burrows
✓ Oct. 11

(Action
completed)

LCM 30/10

(Index)

14/11/47

Next Paper

E 9493

(Minutes.)

Services Liaison Dept.

May we shortly expect a
reply from the Min. Defence?

D. S. Seim
Oct. 23

Please see the attached S.P.S. paper which
is to be taken by the C.O.S. on Wednesday.

C. H. Johnston.
25.X.

BAZ
27.X

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Reference:-
FO 371 / 61960

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Registry
No.

Top Secret.
Secret.
Confidential.
Restricted.
Open.

Draft.

Group-Capt. Staple-
ton,
Cabinet Offices.

Telegram

XXXXXX

(Data)XXXX

RepeatXXXX

from
Mr. Burrows

XEnClair.

Coder

Cypher.

DistributionX--

Copies to :--

E 9411

F.O.,

10 OCT 11 1947
October 11 1947

Dispatch

kk

SECRET

Dear Stapleton,

The Chiefs of Staff are examining various questions connected with the possible withdrawal of British troops from Palestine. We would like to recommend that one of the questions arising from this which ought to be examined urgently is that of the future strategical position of Transjordan. We are continually being told by King Abdullah of the awkward position in which he will find himself in certain circumstances and we shall have to have some discussion with him on the subject in the near future. We should also like to know for our own benefit how Transjordan is going to fit into the strategical picture from the British point of view. There are also other particular questions which seem to raise awkward issues and which I refer to below. *NP* In many ways it seems at first sight that King Abdullah may be right in being apprehensive about the position of Transjordan once a British administration and British forces no longer exist in Palestine. He has some ambitions to acquire the Arab part of Palestine if partition were adopted, but the Mufti, backed by Syria and Egypt, would be most unlikely to agree to this. Transjordan might then find itself surrounded on/

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on three sides by unfriendly States, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Palestine, while it is separated by a long tract of desert from friendly Iraq.

Transjordan is not economically self-supporting and is at present helped by the subsidy provided by H.M.G.

From our point of view it would seem that, whatever happens in Palestine, a friendly Transjordan will remain of considerable strategical importance. We have by our treaty far-reaching facilities for military purposes in Transjordan and we would not anticipate any serious trouble for ~~a considerable~~ ^{some} time to come about the ~~revision~~ ^{maintenance} of these facilities. If we can no longer have forces in Palestine and Egypt, the value of these facilities in Transjordan might increase. Politically, though Transjordan is weak and King Abdullah is at present causing disturbances by his provocative Greater Syria propaganda, we would expect that his influence among the Arab States would usually be on the right side from our point of view. Moreover, King Abdullah is well-known as a loyal friend of ourselves and it would be very bad for our general position if we were to let him down. All this goes to show that there is political and, we suggest, military advantage in maintaining Transjordan in something like its present condition.

The general questions which we suggest should be considered by the Chiefs of Staff are then as follows:-

(1) Would withdrawal from Palestine affect the importance which we attach to Transjordan from the strategical point of view? *Can it make any considerable contribution to the military problems*

(2)

with which we shall be faced if as we fear we cannot retain facilities either in Egypt or Palestine?

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(2) To what extent would our withdrawal from Palestine affect the ability of Transjordan to maintain itself as an independent State?

The more detailed questions which we suggest might also be considered are:-

(a) Will our withdrawal from Palestine involve stationing more or fewer British ~~troops~~ ^{forces} in Transjordan and how would such ~~troops~~ ^{forces} be maintained?

(b) What would be the future of the Arab Legion on our withdrawal from Palestine? We assume that Arab Legion units now in Palestine would have to be withdrawn into Transjordan and that we should then have to discuss with King Abdullah the future strength of the Legion. He would no doubt want to have a comparatively large force, both for military purposes and to prevent unemployment. We should quite likely want for financial reasons to reduce the force if it were no longer to be employed to help the Palestine Administration.

(c) If fighting broke out in Palestine as a result of our withdrawal, King Abdullah would very likely wish to use the Arab Legion there, which would raise most awkward issues, owing to some of the officers being British and to our contribution to the expenses of the Legion. What should our attitude be in this eventuality?

(This possibility is already causing interest in press circles here) (d)/

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(d) What would be the future of the
Transjordan Frontier Force? Its disbandment would cause
difficulty by causing unemployment for the
(who are understood to form about 25%)
~~Transjordanians who form part~~ of its personnel.

PAW
10/12

Yours sincerely,

(Sgd.) B.A. B. Bimows

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NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

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FO 371 / 61960

7

11th October, 1947.

SECRET

The Chiefs of Staff are raising various questions connected with the possible withdrawal of British troops from Palestine. We would like to recommend that one of the questions arising from this which ought to be examined urgently is that of the future strategical position of Transjordan. We are continually being told by King Abdullah of the awkward position in which he will find himself in certain circumstances and we shall have to have some discussion with him on the subject in the near future. We should also like to know for our own benefit how Transjordan is going to fit into the strategical picture from the British point of view. There are also other particular questions which seem to raise awkward issues and which I refer to below.

In many ways it seems at first sight that King Abdullah may be right in being apprehensive about the position of Transjordan once a British administration and British forces no longer exist in Palestine. He has some ambitions to acquire the Arab part of Palestine if partition were adopted, but the Mufti, backed by Syria and Egypt, would be most likely to agree to this. Transjordan might then find itself surrounded on three sides by unfriendly States, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Palestine, while it is separated by a long tract of desert from friendly Iraq.

Transjordan is not economically self-supporting

Group-Captain
D. C. Stapleton, D.F.C., A.F.C.,
Cabinet Offices.

1984

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Reference:-

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371 / 61960

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of 2-

The

(2) To what extent would our withdrawal from Palestine affect the ability of Transjordan to maintain itself as an independent State?

9

The more detailed questions which we suggest might also be considered are:-

(a) Will our withdrawal from Palestine involve stationing more or fewer British forces in Transjordan and how would such forces be maintained?

(b) What would be the future of the Arab Legion on our withdrawal from Palestine? We assume that Arab Legion units now in Palestine would have to be withdrawn into Transjordan and that we should then have to discuss with King Abdullah the future strength of the Legion, in accordance with the provision of Article 3 of the Annex to the Treaty. He would no doubt want to have a comparatively large force, both for military purposes and to prevent unemployment. We should quite likely want for financial reasons to reduce the force if it were no longer to be employed to help the Palestine Administration.

(c) If fighting broke out in Palestine as a result of our withdrawal, King Abdullah would very likely wish to use the Arab Legion there, which would raise most awkward issues, owing to some of the officers being British and to our contribution to the expenses of the Legion. What should our attitude be in this eventuality? (This possibility is already causing interest in press circles here).

(d) What would be the future of the Transjordan Frontier Force? Its disbandment would cause difficulty by causing unemployment for the Transjordanians who are understood to form about twenty-five per cent of its personnel.

Yours sincerely,

(Sgd.) (B.A.B. Burrows)

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Reference:-

FO

371 / 61960

1947

E

PALESTINE

E 9373

9 OCT

Registry Number E9373/9373/31.
FROM
No. 60.
Dated 6 Oct.
Received in Registry 9 Oct.

Palestine, withdrawal of Administration.
Palestine tel 1855 of Oct. 4. Refers to tel 2329, asks whether information required is a report of withdrawal including effective transfer to new authority, or withdrawal leaving a vacuum or both. Two alternatives are very different problems.

Last Paper

(Minutes.)

References

(Print)

(How disposed of)

61960

(Action completed)

(Index)

Next Paper

9411

In P.P. 60. at to P'tial 2329 4/10

[Signature]
(T.E.CABLE)
10/10

JB Oct 10

In P.P. 60. at 2368 5/10

~~2329 4/10~~

The telegram from the High Commissioner is very interesting, but I do not understand why she insisted it is essential that we should remain in Jerusalem in the absence of any agreed settlement.

[Signature]
(T.E.CABLE)
13/10

This tel. must be entered separately as marked, soon please.

JB Oct. 13

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Reference:-

FO

371 / 61960

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E-15
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11

A. Cunningham
 E 9573
 25 OCT 1955

E 9373

15.25 hrs. OCT

15.25 hrs. OCT

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Reference:-

FO 371 / 61960

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Mr. Beith (F.O.)

12

pus

E. /

10 OCT 1947

With the compliments of
— the Under Secretary of State
for the Colonies.

Eastern Division

requested that a copy of
tel. attached should be sent
to you.

Colonial Office,
Downing Street,
9th Oct. 1947.

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Reference:-

FO

371 / 61960

5
13

Cypher (O.T.P.)

FROM S. OF S., COLONIES.

Sent 2nd October, 1947. 15.40 hrs.

IMMEDIATE

No. 2329 Top Secret.

Repeated to U.K. Delegation, New York, for
Martín.

Situation may well develop at General Assembly in which we shall be obliged to state a definite date for the completion of the withdrawal of British Forces and Administration from Palestine. With this possibility in view, service and other departments concerned have been asked to prepare a draft report to the Chiefs of Staff for preliminary consideration by P.A.C.'s Committee on Thursday, 9th October, in anticipation of estimate being ready for cabling to New York within 3 weeks at the outside from now. It is thought most convenient method of stating a time limit may be in the form of a minimum and maximum period, e.g., not earlier than 6 months and not later than 1 year after commencement of withdrawal.

2. C.s in C., M.E.L.F., will shortly be asked to make preliminary estimate in collaboration with you, and this estimate must of course take into account necessities for parallel or prior withdrawal of civil administration. In view of short time available before preliminary discussions here on this question it will be most helpful to have by telegram a brief preliminary statement of the major civil problems involved in withdrawal with such observations as you are able to make at this stage regarding possible methods of dealing with them.

(Copies sent to Foreign Office for transmission to New York) r

Distributed to: (RM)

R. 243
Secretary of State
Sir T. Lloyd
Mr. I. Thomas
Sir S. Caine
Sir C. Jeffries
Mr. Holding
Foreign Office
War Office (M.O.4.)
Ministry of Defence

Mr. Martin
Mr. Trafford Smith
Mr. Gutch
Mr. Mathieson
Mr. Higham
Mr. Galsworthy
Mr. Fitzgerald
Mr. Barrows.
Lt. Col. Charteris.
Gp. Capt. Stapleton.
Major G.C. Mears.

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
1	2	3	4	5	6
	1			2	

OUTWARD TELEGRAM

24 14

75872/154/13/47

Cypher (O.T.P.)



mi

11 OCT 1947

TO PALESTINE (General Sir A. Cunningham)

FROM S. OF S., COLONIES.

Sent 5th October, 1947. 11.00 hrs.

IMPORTANT

No. 2368 Top Secret.

Addressed High Commissioner Palestine.
Repeated United Kingdom Delegation New York for
Martin.

Your top secret telegram No. 1855.

Information is required primarily in respect of
latter alternative, namely withdrawal leaving a vacuum,
but it would be useful to have statement covering both
alternatives in outline.

2. In the case of withdrawal leaving a vacuum do
you consider there could be any effective small scale
local handing over, at least in areas definitely Jewish
or definitely Arab, to local bodies or institutions such
as Mayors, Municipal Councils etc.
(Copies sent to Foreign Office for onward transmission)

Distributed to:-

R. 243	Mr. Martin
Secretary of State	Mr. Trafford Smith
Sir T. Lloyd	Mr. Gutch
Col. Rees-Williams	Mr. Mathieson
Sir S. Caine	Mr. Higham
Sir C. Jeffries	Mr. Galsworthy
Mr. Holding	Mr. Fitzgerald
Ministry of Defence	Major Meers.
Foreign Office	Private Secretary.
War Office (M.O. 4)	Mr. Beith.
Admiralty	Mr. Burrows
No. 10 Downing Street	Lt. Col. Charteris.
Cabinet Offices	Mr. G.C.D. Dods.
	P.S. to Prime Minister.
	Gp. Capt. Stapleton.

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Reference:-

FO 371 / 61960

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E 9493

1947

PALESTINE

13 OCT

Registry
Number

FROM

No.

Dated

Received
in Registry

Last Paper

9411

References

(Print)

(How disposed of)

Tel. No. 3496

Oct 15

8/80. Mather in

✓ Oct-24

Capt. Trafford Smith

80

from Mr. Burrows.

✓ Oct 27

(Action
completed)

(Index)

J. E. M. 6/11

14/10/48

Next Paper

E9715.

Palestine, withdrawal of administration
Refer EO. Ctr 2329 & 2368 (E 9373/9373/11)

fact lot of major problem that
will arise out of withdrawal from
Palestine is concerned that withdrawal
cannot include military forces from
Jerusalem etc.

PALESTINE TUA 1889 8/10

(Minutes.)

Some

of the points raised in this tel.

are being dealt with in a
minute which is being prepared
by Mr. Burrows. If we stayed

on, even for the best of
motives, in Jerusalem, Haifa

and Lydda this would

viciate the main talking-point

in favour of our withdrawal,

which is that no "imperialistic"

reasons are keeping us in

Palestine. We should be

accused of inviting a shambles

but keeping what we really wanted

Services liaison Sept.

J. S. Davis

Oct. 14

Pl.

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Reference:-
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17 AB Surveys

16. x

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SS

 $23 \cdot x$

10/10

Art. 28

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Minutes.

Inf. P. Postline tel 1989 24/10¹⁸

JB Oct. 31

Inf. P. Postline tel 2145 13/11

JB Nov. 19

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Reference:-

FO 371 / 61960

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Registry
No.

Draft To

Sir A. Cadogan,
New York.

No 3496.

Date Oct 15/52

Cypher

Repeat Jerusalem

depl. no. 1

Copies 60.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

OUT FILE

19

~~Ref 714-1/16~~

IMMEDIATE
SECRET

~~SECRET~~

[Repeated High Commissioner for
Palestine No. 2473.]

Following for Martin from Colonial
Office. High Commissioner's telegram
to Secretary of State No. 1889 [Top Secret]
repeated UKDEL for you. [Civil problems
of withdrawal.]

In Paragraph 10 of his telegram
High Commissioner suggests that
consequences of our withdrawal leaving a
vacuum should be made plain in stark
detail to Arabs and Jews. We feel
here that such ^astep would be salutary but
would be grateful for your views on its
desirability at present juncture in the
light of the situation in New York.
If you agree please telegraph to
High Commissioner (to whom this telegram
is being repeated) with indication of

/best

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best timing for High Commissioner's
announcement which would no doubt be
made to Arab and Jewish leaders in
Jerusalem and also to the press there.

Foreign Office agree that if
you see no objection High Commissioner
should make statement on lines suggested.

JB
out. 15

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NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

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Cypher/OTP

DEPARTMENTAL NO.1

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO NEW YORK
(To United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No. 3496
15th October, 1947

D. 7.14 a.m. 16th October, 1947

Repeated to Jerusalem

IMMEDIATE
SECRET

[Repeated High Commissioner for Palestine
No. 2473].

Following for Martin from Colonial Office.
High Commissioner's telegram to Secretary of State
No. 1889 [Top Secret] repeated United Kingdom
Delegation for you. [Civil problems of withdrawal].

In paragraph 10 of this telegram High Commissioner suggests that consequences of our withdrawal leaving a vacuum should be made plain in stark detail to Arabs and Jews. We feel here that such a step would be salutary but would be grateful for your views on its desirability at present juncture in the light of the situation in New York. If you agree please telegraph to High Commissioner (to whom this telegram is being repeated) with indication of best timing for High Commissioner's announcement which would no doubt be made to Arab and Jewish leaders in Jerusalem and also to the press there.

Foreign Office agree that if you see no objection High Commissioner should make statement on lines suggested.

k k k

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Reference:-

FO

371 / 61960

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22

My dear Beth,

Could you please have
the attached, if you
agree, sent to New York
IMMEDIATE SECRET.

Burrows' conversation with
Hafford Smith ref
Hafford's letter 45872/154/13
of 10th October ref.

Yours ever
W H Catherin

15 October 47.

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Reference:-



371 / 61960

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INWARD TELEGRAM

E 9493/9373/31

15 OCT 1947

Cypher (O.T.P.)

FROM PALESTINE (General Sir A. Cunningham)

TO S. OF S., COLONIES.

D.11th October, 1947.

R.11th " " 15.35 hrs.

IMMEDIATE

No. 1903 Top Secret.

Your telegram No. 2415.

Withdrawal.

If the police are included, and on the assumption that oil companies would not evacuate their essential personnel, only comment on the first paragraph of your telegram is that figure under (c) would not exceed 200. But as explained in my telegram No. 1889, I contemplate that the police would remain after the withdrawal of the Government, in which case figure under (a) would be 450 and under (b) would be some figure which cannot be estimated until terms to be offered for retention are known, but might be taken for present purposes as 500.

2. Paragraph 3 of your telegram raises the question of whether His Majesty's Government contemplate taking over all assets and liabilities of the present Palestine Government in the absence of any satisfactory arrangement for transfer to successor Government or Governments, and it is on this question that I should be grateful for an early indication of your views. The only immovable assets which we could retain and protect would be those situated in the proposed enclaves. In regard to movable assets i.e. stores and vehicles, I had contemplated concentrating these in Palestine with a view either to selling off locally or transferring later to the new Government or Governments, with or without payment as may be necessary and appropriate. In any case, certain stores, such as medical stores and food, would have to be distributed without payment before the withdrawal of the Administration. Police stores and vehicles would remain to the end, i.e. until completion (five groups omitted) with an

Effect/

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Reference:-

FO

371 / 61960

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24

- (b) requiring witnesses to swear or affirm;

Distributed to: -

Mr. Trafford Smith
Mr. Hatch
Mr. Matheison
Mr. Higdon
Mr. Galanovsky
Mr. Fitzgerald

Major Mears.
Mr. Beith.
Mr. Burrows.
Lt. Col. M. M. Chartoris.
Mr. G. C. B. Dodds.

A vertical ruler with a scale from 0 to 10. The ruler is divided into two main sections. The top section is labeled '1' and contains six boxes numbered 1 through 6. The bottom section is labeled '2' and contains six boxes numbered 1 through 6. The ruler has tick marks every 1 unit and every 0.1 units.

reference:-

○

371 / 61960

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OUTWARD TELEGRAM

E9493/9373/31 INDEXED

14 OCT 1947

75872/154/13/47

Cypher (O.T.P.)

TO PALESTINE (General Sir A. Cunningham)

FROM S. OF S. COLONIES.

Sent 10th October, 1947. 12.00 hrs.

IMMEDIATE

No. 2415 Top Secret.

Your telegram No. 1889.

Withdrawal.

For study of movement problem we have supplied following estimate of personnel shipping capacity required for civil administration:

- (a) British officers 750.
- (b) British police other ranks 3,800.
- (c) Other British civilians requiring evacuation 500.
- (d) If return of wives and families is effected before withdrawal add 500 women and children.

2. Above estimate would be reduced by British Civilian element remaining Jerusalem, Lydda and Haifa in circumstances envisaged in your paragraph 1 until effective successor government or governments established.

3. Grateful for your early telegraphic comment on our estimate and for approximate assessment of tonnage of administrative and police stores and number of police and civilian vehicles requiring ultimate evacuation.

Distributed to: -/

1	2	3	4	5	6

Reference: FO 371 / 61960

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84/85-48

Distributed to:-

R. 243
 Secretary of State
 Sir T. Lloyd
 Mr. Rees-Williams
 Sir S. Caine
 Sir C. Jeffries
 Mr. Holding
 Mr. Martin
 Mr. Trafford Smith
 Mr. Gutch
 Mr. Mathieson
 Mr. Higham
 Mr. Galsworthy
 Mr. Fitzgerald
 Ministry of Defence
 Foreign Office
 " "
 War Office (M.O.4.)
 Admiralty

- Major Mears.
 - Mr. Beith.
 - Mr. Burrows.
 - Lt.Col. M.M. Charteris.
 - Mr. G.C.B. Dodds.

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FO 371 / 61960

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2. Dept

OUTWARD TELEGRAM

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23

75872/154/13/46

Cypher (O.T.P.)

We could consider retiring to the South (of Palestine) pending withdrawal. I do not, however, see why we have to make statement of this before we know what are the proposals submitted.

we cannot consider returning to the South. I do not see how we can have a statement of this before we know what are the proposals submitted.

TO PALESTINE (General Sir A. Cunningham)
FROM S. OF S., COLONIES.

Sent 2nd October, 1947. 15.40 hrs.

IMMEDIATE

No. 2329 Top Secret

Repeated to U.K. Delegation, New York, for Martin.

Situation may well develop at General Assembly in which we shall be obliged to state a definite date for the completion of the withdrawal of British Forces and Administration from Palestine. With this possibility in view, service and other departments concerned have been asked to prepare a draft report to the Chiefs of Staff for preliminary consideration by P.A.C.'s Committee on Thursday, 9th October, in anticipation of estimate being ready for cabling to New York within 3 weeks at the outside from now. It is thought most convenient method of stating a time limit may be in the form of a minimum and maximum period, e.g., not earlier than 6 months and not later than 1 year after commencement of withdrawal.

2. C.B. in C., M.E.L.F., will shortly be asked to make preliminary estimate in collaboration with you, and this estimate must of course take into account necessity for parallel or prior withdrawal of civil administration. In view of short time available before preliminary discussions here on this question it will be most helpful to have by telegram a brief preliminary statement of the major civil problems involved in withdrawal with such observations as you are able to make at this stage regarding

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FO 371 / 61960

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regarding possible methods of dealing with them.

(Copies sent to Foreign Office for transmission to New York).

Distributed to:-

R.243
Secretary of State
Sir T. Lloyd
Col. Rees-Williams
Sir S. Caine
Sir C. Jeffries
Mr. Holding
Mr. Martin
Mr. Trafford Smith
Mr. Mathieson
Mr. Higham
Mr. Galsworthy
Mr. Fitzgerald
Ministry of Defence
Foreign Office
" "
" "
War Office (M.O.4.)
Admiralty
No.10 Downing Street

Major Mears.
Private Secretary.
Mr. Baith.
Mr. Burrows.
Lt. Col. Cherteris.
Mr. G.C.B. Dodds.
P.S. to Prime Minister.


1	2	3	4	5	6
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Reference:-
FO 371 / 61950

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INWARD TELEGRAM

29
24
enter soon



Cypher (O.T.P.)

FROM PALESTINE (General Sir A. Cunningham)

TO S. OF S., COLONIES.

D. 8th October, 1947.

R. 9th " " 01.30 hrs.

IMMEDIATE

E 2493

No. 1889 Top Secret.

Addressed S. of S.

Repeated U.K. Delegation New York for Martin.

Your telegrams Nos. 2329 and 2368.

I shall deal first with the problems involved in withdrawal leaving a vacuum and must state at the outset my conviction that such a withdrawal cannot include the withdrawal of military forces from Jerusalem and other enclaves referred to below. In order to extricate ourselves from the Palestine conflict it is (impracticable) to contemplate abandoning the Holy City of Jerusalem to anarchy and bloodshed. I have therefore assumed that with effect from withdrawal of Palestine Government a British force would remain in Jerusalem for the sole purpose of protecting holy places and maintaining order in Jerusalem until a modus vivendi for the city had been evolved. I can foresee no objection from any quarter to this necessary precaution, whereas without it the trouble that would certainly start in Jerusalem and might spread far beyond Palestine would be fairly laid at our door. The maintenance of a force in Jerusalem would require its communications to be safeguarded through Lydda Air Port and Haifa Port, and I estimate that small force would have to remain at Lydda and Haifa to protect British interests until some recognisable Government or Governments were set up. The force at Lydda would also protect the source of Jerusalem's water supply.

2./

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Reference:-
FO
371 / 61960

2. In the time available I have not been able to discuss in detail with the G.O.C. the question of the size of this force (which would include some British Police) or their precise function. It is, however, clear that withdrawal of civil administration must be completed before that of the military force and that, when civil administration is withdrawn, there will be no law to administer and the Military Commander will be in complete control of the enclaves selected as those in which order of protection of Christian and British interests must be maintained by military forces. It is also clear that controlling factors in respect of time required for withdrawal will be military and not civil.

3. On this basis I estimate that period within which withdrawal of civil administration could be completed after commencement would be not less than one month and ought not to be longer than two months. Some major problems that would arise would be:-

(a) All postal, telegraph and telephone facilities would cease.

(b) Employment of all non-expatriated Government officers would cease. They would be paid before completion of the withdrawal an advance of four months salary.

(c) The railway would cease to operate, and if this took place in the citrus season, citrus exports to the United Kingdom would be halved; with the removal of its British Chairman, the Citrus Marketing Board would break up, and loans made to it for packing materials totalling £2,300,000 (repayable before the end of March, 1948), as well as outstanding advances to citrus growers, totalling £8,750,000, would not be recoverable.

(d) Currency reserve stocks would be removed to the U.K. unless these were absorbed in a run on banks, which might necessitate a moratorium. Discussions with Barclays Bank indicate that banks would be unable to operate. Exchange control would cease; the consequence of this would be unpredictable.

(e) Food supplies would be sufficient for at least three months, but there would be no provision for the necessary imports after that time. The Jews would look after themselves in this respect.

(f)/

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INWARD TELEGRAM

(f) Customs and immigration control would cease. There would be no quarantine control, human or animal, which might have serious consequences from e.g. cholera in Egypt.

(g) Lydda Airport, which is now served by the International Airlines, must be maintained with its meteorological and other services from Palestine Government balances, and its continued operation secured by a military force.

(h) All valuable records, such as land registration and survey documents, court files, contracts, agreements and leases and some police and personnel records would be concentrated in Jerusalem or Haifa and kept under military guard.

(i) Most of the Government water supplies, Hospitals and Schools would be taken over by the Municipalities and local Councils concerned.

(j) Prisoners and most lunatics would be released since there would be no authority under which they could be detained.

(k) Stores (medical, engineering, printing, police and others) and vehicles would be brought to Jerusalem or Haifa as far as possible and kept under military guard.

(l) Evacuation of hired (corrupt group) (costing some £250,000 per annum) is a major administrative problem which we are considering together with action to be taken on uncompleted works contracts.

(m) Livestock would be sold off.

(n) Our obligations to the Reparations Commission in respect of immovable enemy property could not be discharged.

(o) The Director of Antiquities has been authorised to make tentative enquiries of U.S. Consul General as to whether the U.S. Government would assume responsibility for the safety of museum building and its unique and valuable contents:

(p)/

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[illegible]

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INWARD TELEGRAM

made, it is important to be clear that, in absence of an authority or authorities covering the whole of Palestine, it will be impracticable to carry out any transfer. The position would then be similar to that of withdrawal leaving a vacuum. It may well be that a provisional Government could be set up by the Jews for a Jewish State and that, provided that the creation of such a State were first approved in principle by the United Nations Assembly, we would not resist its establishment. But we could not transfer to such Government the services proposed for Economic Board (Railways and Ports, Posts and Telegraphs and Customs) and Lydda Airport, and, in the absence of Arab agreement and of any authority to take them over, local situation would become one in which it would be impossible for the Government of Palestine to continue to function in Arab areas and Jerusalem. At the best, even if the majority plan of the United Nations Committee with modified boundaries and Economic Board were to be put into effect with the agreement of both sides, the period of which you require an estimate, so far as civil problems only are concerned, would be at least six months and ought not to be more than a year. The minimum period (but not the maximum) would increase in proportion to the difficulties resulting from lack of agreement.


9. Local authorities could no doubt take over administratively some services of purely local significance, such as food distribution and hospitals and schools, and maintain them temporarily from special taxation, but this would be a minor contribution to maintaining major public services which our withdrawal would disrupt.

10. The consequences withdrawal without settlement, when set out in black and white as above appear in their true character as a disaster and a tragedy for the people of Palestine. We have hitherto refrained from explaining publicly in these terms exactly what such a withdrawal would mean, but, if you agree, I should think it desirable that opportunity should be taken here to get it across that such things are really the alternative to an agreed settlement and that the people of Palestine have it in their hands (and probably in their hands only) to avoid them.

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11. I should emphasise that estimates of times given in this telegram relate to civil problems only. The military problems of transporting and evacuating their stores and personnel appear at first sight to be very formidable; this might no doubt present on examination a different picture from that obtainable from estimates given in this telegram. Ends.

(Copies sent to Foreign Office for transmission to UNDEL New York).

Distributed to:-

R. 243
Secretary of State
Sir T. Lloyd
Col. Ross-Williams
Sir S. Cairne
Sir C. Jeffries
Mr. Holding
Mr. Martin
Mr. Trafford Smith
Mr. Gutch
Mr. Mathieson
Mr. Higham
Mr. Galworthy
Mr. Fitzgerald
Ministry of Defence
Foreign Office
" "
" "
War Office (M.O.4.)
Admiralty
No. 10 Downing Street

" Major Meare.
" Private Secretary.
" Mr. Beith.
" Mr. Burrows.
" Lt. Col. Charteris.
" Mr. G.C.B. Dodds.
" P.S. to Prime Minister.

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1	2	3	4	5	6

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Reference:-

FO 371 / 61960

Registry
No. E 9493

Top Secret.
Secret.
Confidential.
Restricted.
Open. *N*

B. B.

Draft.

Mr. Trafford
Smith,
COLONIAL OFFICE

from

Mr. B. A. B.
Burrows.

Dear Trafford Smith,

Sargent has asked me to call attention to ^athe point in the High Commissioner's telegram No. 1889 of October 8th which we do not at first sight well understand. In paragraph 3. of the telegram the High Commissioner suggests that if we were withdrawing without any alternative authority having been set up, the civil administration should be withdrawn in one or two months. In paragraph 8. however, the High Commissioner suggests that if there is an alternative authority, withdrawal would require between six months and a year.

We are not quite clear why there is such a large difference between these estimates, and we are inclined to feel that the longer period quoted in paragraph 8. would lay us open to all kinds of difficulties by involving us in the problems of transition and making us bear responsibility in some measure for the settlement which was to

/follow

OUT FILE FOREIGN OFFICE. S.W.1. ^{24h}

27 October 1947. ^{27h}

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5
6

Reference:-

FO

371 / 61960

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NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Can you please elucidate the point for us?

Yours sincerely,

SA 83.

 $23 \cdot x$

(Sgd.) B.A.B. Burrows.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

36

[illegible]

OUT FILE

37

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

27th October, 1947.

(E. 9493/9373/31)

SECRET

Dear Trafford Smith,

Sargent has asked me to call attention to a point in the High Commissioner's telegram No. 1889 of the 8th October which we do not at first sight well understand. In paragraph 3 of the telegram the High Commissioner suggests that if we were withdrawing without any alternative authority having been set up, the civil administration should be withdrawn in one or two months. In paragraph 8 however, the High Commissioner suggests that if there is an alternative authority, withdrawal would require between six months and a year.

We are not quite clear why there is such a large difference between these estimates and we are inclined to feel that the longer period quoted in paragraph 8 would lay us open to all kinds of difficulties by involving us in the problems of transition and making us bear responsibility in some measure for the settlement which was to follow our withdrawal.

Can you please elucidate the point for us?

Yours sincerely,

(Sgd.) (B.A.B. Burrows)

Trafford Smith, Esq.,
Colonial Office.

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1	2	3	4	5	6

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FO 371 / 61960

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INWARD TELEGRAM

(AMENDED COPY. Amendment underlined.)

Cypher (O.T.P.)

FROM PALESTINE (General Sir A. Cunningham)

TO S. OF S., COLONIES.

D. 24th October, 1947.

R. 24th " " 21.30 hrs.

IMMEDIATE

No. 1989 Top Secret and Personal.

Addressed to Colonial Office.
Repeated to the United Kingdom Delegation New York
No. 1466 for the S. of S.

Following personal for Lloyd from Cunningham.

Begins.

Your No. 1889 (? No. 2551 intended) is most useful to us as a basis on which to start provisional planning. I would make the following remarks. The references are to sub heads of your paragraph 2.

(a) and (s). I have discussed military withdrawal with the General Officer Commanding. After the citrus season is over, i.e. in March, the railways could be used to concentrate all military stores in Haifa in a period of four or five weeks. The bottleneck in removing troops and stores will be shipping and capacity of Haifa Port, but as a Force is being left in Haifa anyway I (21st intended) could be also responsible for the protection of such stores as are left after the main body has departed. The Haifa enclave, anyway to start with, would have to run from just south of Acre to Atlit.

(e). This sub-paragraph has, I think, arrived corrupt. As it stands, it seems to imply that the Military Commander would require a full Civil Affairs Branch carrying out normal duties as at present. Our idea was that he would only require a few British civil officers to assist him in each enclave. There would also require to be a small number of others to go on with winding up.

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(d) I am clear that Jerusalem must be either left under international care or safeguarded by us. I could not be associated with any proposal to abandon it without proper safeguard. There would, I think, be difficulties in making our troops subordinate to an international body, but these difficulties would not arise in the case of the police. If, therefore, the proposal of a U.N.O. organisation taking over is adopted, I suggest we make the police only available. At that period when the withdrawal will be nearing completion we could concentrate quite a considerable number of British police in Jerusalem. Ends.

* Correction received 27th October, 1947.

X Telegraph Section Note

Sub paragraph referred to correctly sent.

(Copies sent to Foreign Office for onward transmission to New York).

Distributed to:-

R.243	Mr. Martin
Secretary of State	Mr. Trafford Smith
Sir T. Lloyd	Mr. Gutch
Mr. Rees-Williams	Mr. Mathieson
Sir S. Caine	Mr. Higham
Sir C. Jaffries	Mr. Galsworthy
Mr. Holding	Mr. Fitzgerald
Foreign Office	Mr. Burrows.
"	Mr. Garren.
"	Mr. Beith.
War Office (M.O.4.)	Lt.Col. M.M. Charteris.
No.10 Downing Street	Private Secretary.
Ministry of Defence	Lt.Col. Gleadell.

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371 / 61960

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9493 9773 11

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1	2	3	4	5	6
Reference:-					
FO					
371 / 61960					

42

Copies sent to:-

Cabinet Offices

" "

Ministry of Defence

Treasury

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Admiralty

"

"

"

War Office

" "

" "

Ministry of Transport (M.O.T.)

" "

Air Ministry

" "

Foreign Office

" "

" "

M.I. 5

- Mr. S.B.V. Lunn,
- Brig. Cornwall-Forsyth,
- Commander Stewart,
- Mr. A.D. Keeling,
- Mr. D.F.C. Hill,
- Mr. W. Russell-Smith,
- Mr. E.H.N. Gifford,
- Captain MacGillivray,
- Capt. D.H. Halliday,
- Mr. G.C.B. Bond,
- Brig. C.E.G. Wainwright,
- Brig. L.L. Vennart-Smith,
- Lt. Col. Chapple,
- Mr. D.F. Picknell,
- Mr. F.C. Rennie,
- Air Commodore Brock,
- Group Capt. V.E.B. Smith,
- Mr. S.A.B. Burrows,
- Mr. P. Gifford,
- Mr. J.G.B. Berry,
- Mr. J.C. Robertson.

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Reference:-

FO

371 / 61960

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4

1947

E

E 9715

43

PALESTINE

18 OCT

Registry
Number

TELEGRAM FROM

No.

Dated

Received
in Registry

E 9715/9373/31

Sir O. Dickson

Liman

312

17 Oct
18weekend from Palestine
Effect on Transjordan.As per on Transjordan is concerned there is a
series of enquiry as to impending British
Expedition from Palestine,
Further treatment.

Last Paper.

9493

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

8, Matheran. 80

M.O. 4

M.I. 39

Admiralty

A.M.

Gr. Est. Stapleton

set

Nov. 12

(Action
completed.)

98/11/11

(Index.)

14/9/48

Next Paper.

9734

(Minutes.)

Rebuted to Washington

J. H. H. H.
(J. H. H. H.)
20/10The unno. tel. under
reference cannot be traced

See minute on E 9799/951/31

J. H. H. H.
Oct. 22

JB Nov. 10

1	2	3	4	5	6
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Reference:-

FO

371 / 61960

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() E 44

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on]

Cypher/OTP

DIPLOMATIC (SECRET)

FROM AMMAN TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Sir A. Kirkbride D. 1.00 p.m. 17th October 1947
No. 312 R. 3.10 p.m. 17th October 1947

17th October 1947

Repeated to United Kingdom Delegation New York

Bagdad

Beirut

Cairo

Damascus

Jedda

British Middle East Office Cairo

Jerusalem (Saving)

E 9715

18 OCT

TOP SECRET

Jerusalem unnumbered telegram of October 14th to Colonial Secretary, Palestine.

As far as Transjordan is concerned it is true that there is a sense of urgency as to impending British departure from Palestine. This has been caused largely in response to various public utterances, made subsequent to Creech-Jones' statement of September 26th, which have done much to justify initial scepticism with which the announcement of impending withdrawal was treated.

2. I do not feel that the note of caution suggested in paragraph 5 of High Commissioner's telegram can be sounded without weakening the impression of sincerity of our determination to leave Palestine, which has been carefully fostered in accordance with your telegram No. 3318 to New York. I feel that any modifying statement that does not also give a definite date for the final evacuation will be regarded as "hedging".

5. Foreign Office please pass to United Kingdom Delegation New York, Bagdad, Cairo, Damascus, Jedda, British Middle East Office as my telegrams Nos. 10, 59, 96, 83, 58 and 47 respectively.

[Repeated to United Kingdom Delegation New York, Bagdad, Cairo, Damascus, Jedda and British Middle East Office Cairo].

XXX

18 OCT
XXXXXXXXXX

1	2	3	4	5	6

Reference:-
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371 / 61960

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E

E 9734

20 OCT

PALESTINE

10 17

Registry
Number

FROM

No.

Dated

Received
in Registry

E9734/9873/31

Referred to
Colonial Office

75872/154/13

to M. Burrows

10 Oct

18 -

45
Referred from Palestine
Refer Palestine to 1889 of 8/10 (E9493/9873/31)
Invited attention of Secretary of Administration
to point made by H/C in paper
to refer same to H/C of H/C
Proposed to write to H/C of H/C
to be on account of certain considerations arising
from H/C of H/C that we should retain control
of Jerusalem by such military force as may be
adequate and should be maintained now.

Last Paper

9715

References

(Print)

(How disposed of)

(Minutes.)

Tel. was sent on E9493/9873/31
JB out-27

(Action
completed)

LC 28/10

(Index)

LC 28/10

Next Paper

E9834

38598

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Reference:-

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371 / 61960

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Colonial Office,
Church House,
Great Smith Street,
London, S.W. 1.

My Reference.....75872/154/13.

October 10, 1947.

Your Reference

Important

E 0734

Der Buntz

20 OCT
You will have seen the telegram from the High Commissioner for Palestine (No. 1889 of the 8th October) regarding the civil problems of withdrawal. We have taken the opportunity of a meeting of the Directors of Administrative Plans, who were this morning giving further consideration to their draft paper JAP/P(47)39 on the administrative implications of the withdrawal from Palestine, to invite their attention to the points made by the High Commissioner. They propose to refer to the telegram in their submission to Chiefs of Staff, but have made it clear that in their appreciation they have taken no account of the problems involved in maintaining a force in Jerusalem as suggested by the High Commissioner.

2. We therefore propose to write to Stapleton and suggest that in their examination of the problems of withdrawal the Chiefs of Staff should be invited to take account of certain considerations arising from the High Commissioner's telegram, in particular of the view, which we for our part support, that until responsibility for order in Jerusalem and the protection of the Holy Places can be handed over to some effective alternative power, we should retain control of the city by such military force as may be considered adequate. We should be glad to know urgently what the Foreign Office attitude is to the High Commissioner's suggestion.

B.A.B. BURROWS, ESQ.

/ and

[illegible]

Reference:-



371 / 61960

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47
and whether you concur in our proposed approach to the Chiefs of Staff.

3. In paragraph 10 of his telegram the High Commissioner suggests that it might be valuable to face both Arabs and Jews squarely with the stark details of the consequences of our withdrawal and their failure to agree. This seems eminently desirable and quite in line with our present policy, and if you agree, we propose to ask Martin by telegram for the views of the delegation on the advisability of such action, and also for the delegation's advice on timing. To be effective the full revelation of the consequences of withdrawal leaving a vacuum should be made quickly. No doubt the best means would be for the High Commissioner to make a statement to Arab and Jewish leaders as he did recently and also possibly to the Press.

4. If you wish to discuss the implications of the telegram Mathieson and I will gladly come over. We do feel strongly that speed is essential if the best use is to be made of the High Commissioner's telegram both in consideration of the problem of withdrawal here and in inducing realism into Arab and Jewish thinking in Palestine, and UNO thinking in New York.

Yours sincerely

Trafford Smith

(Trafford Smith)

RECEIVED

1800. 10/11/48

1800. 10/11/48

1800. 10/11/48

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Reference:-

FO

371 / 61960

1942

E

E 9834

22 OCT

PALESTINE

Registry Number } E 9834/9373/21
 FROM } W. A. B. Mather
 No. } Colonial Office
 Dated } 14 Dec.
 Received in Registry } 16 Oct
 22 ~

Withdrawal from Palestine.
 Encloses copy of Palestine at 1928 "10
 also copy of draft at New York
 in reply. re Press Statement on
 withdrawal.

Last Paper

9734

References

(Print)

(How disposed of)

Rel. New York.
 3517
 16, Oct
 8, Matherian P.O.
 Oct 22

(Action completed)

16/10/42

(Index)

14/9/42

Next Paper

E 9933

(Minutes.)

In P.P. 8 Oct 2500 16/10.

JBort. 23

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Reference:-

FO 371 / 61960

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22 OCT

1928 attached. Neither our press
section nor yours (according
to Matthews) has made any
comment on lines of para 1.
We have so informed High
Commissioner and would be
grateful if you could arrange
for despatch of attached draft
telegram SECRET IMMEDIATE to
New York. Yours well,
C. W. Matthews

1 2 3 4 5 6
 1 2
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Cypher (O.T.P.)

FROM PALESTINE (General Sir A. Cunningham)

TO S. OF S. COLONIES.

D. 15th October, 1947.
R. 15th " " 13.45 hrs.

IMMED LATE

No.1928 Top Secret and Personal.

Addressed S. of S.
Repeated UKDEL New York (S. of S. please pass as
my No. 1412).

Local Jewish press, under banner headlines "Withdrawal of H.M.G. Brings Chaos" states assurances have been given (by H.M.G.) that evacuation of Palestine will be carried out in a manner not leading to chaos or frustration of U.N. efforts to settle the problem".

2. Although I assume that presentation of this news item in this manner is only another attempt of many made by Jews to make differences of opinion between H.M.G. and Palestine Government, I would be glad to be informed whether there has been, in fact, any official contradiction or disassociation with what I said to Foreign press correspondents on 9th October, which I believe was fully reported in the Times.

(Copies sent to Foreign Office for retransmission to New York).

Distributed to: -

R. 243
Secretary of State
Sir T. Lloyd
Mr. Rees-Williams
Sir S. Caine
Sir C. Jeffries
Mr. Holding

Mr. Martin
Mr. Trafford Smith
Mr. Gutch
Mr. Mathieson
Mr. Higham
Mr. Galsworthy
Mr. Fitzgerald

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Reference:- FO 371 / 61950

OUTWARD TELEGRAM

E / /

75872/154/19/47

Cypher (O.T.P.)

18 OCT 1947

TO PALESTINE (General Sir A. Cunningham)

FROM S. OF S., COLONIES.

Sent 16th October, 1947. 19.15 hrs.

IMMEDIATE

No. 2500 Top Secret and Personal.

Your telegram No. 1928.

Withdrawal.

No statement has been made by official spokesman in United Kingdom to effect that His Majesty's Government will ensure that evacuation of Palestine will be carried out in a manner not leading to chaos or frustration of United Nations efforts to settle the problem. Recent Press enquiry on this topic was in fact answered to effect that unless Arabs and Jews reached some accommodation the circumstances of withdrawal would be "near-anarchy".

2. Guidance to United Kingdom press has been in line with your statement to Foreign correspondents on 9th October which received good press here.

3. Substance of this telegram is being sent to New York for Martin.

Distributed to:-

R.243
Secretary of State
Sir T. Lloyd
Mr. D. Rees-Williams
Sir S. Caine
Sir C. Jeffries
Mr. Holding
Mr. Martin
Foreign Office

Mr. Trafford Smith
Mr. Gutch
Mr. Mathieson
Mr. Higham
Mr. Galsworthy
Mr. Fitzgerald

Mr. J.G.S. Beith.

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NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Registry
No.

Draft Telegram

Sir A Cadogan

New York

5514
Cypher Oct 16

Dept. 1. NY 1

Copy C.O.
(Mr Mathison)

OUT FILE

14/10 52

Date

8/5

IMMEDIATE

SECRET

Following for Martin
from Colonial Office
High Commissioner's
Telegram No 1928 repeated
UKDEL as 14/12
Press comment on with-
drawal. No statement
has been made by
official spokesman in
United Kingdom to effect
that H.N.C. will ensure
that evacuation of
Palestine will be
carried out in a manner

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Reference:-

FO

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not leading to chaos or
frustration of U. N.
efforts to settle the
problem. Recent press
enquiry on this topic
was in fact answered
to effect that unless
Jews and Arabs reached
some accommodation
the circumstances of
withdrawal would be
"near-anarchy".

2. Guidance to U. K. press
has been in line with
High Commissioner's
statement to foreign
correspondents on 9th
October which received

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NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

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Cypher/OTP

DEPARTMENTAL NO.1.

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO NEW YORK

(To United Kingdom Delegation to the United Nations)

No.3517

16th October, 1947.

D. 8.15 p.m. 16th October, 1947.

IMMEDIATE
SECRET

Following for Martin from Colonial Office.

High Commissioner's telegram No.1928 repeated
UKDEL as No.1412.

Press comment on withdrawal. No statement has been made by official spokesman in United Kingdom to effect that His Majesty's Government will ensure that evacuation of Palestine will be carried out in a manner not leading to chaos or frustration of United Nations efforts to settle the problem. Recent press enquiry on this topic was in fact answered to effect that unless Jews and Arabs reached some accommodation the circumstances of withdrawal would be "near-anarchy".

2. Guidance to United Kingdom press has been in line with High Commissioner's statement to Foreign correspondents on 9th October which received good press here.

3. The above has been conveyed to High Commissioner.

QQQ

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371 / 61960

1017	E	E 9933
	PALESTINE	24 OCT

Registry Number E 9933/9373/31

FROM M Berley

No. 110, New York

Dated 18 Oct

Received in Registry 24

Week drawn from Palestine.

Refer 40. 61 3536 (E9726/1020/31) Encloses copy of memo prepared by Mr. Gellaway on subject of withdrawal from Palestine

Last Paper

9834

References

(Print)

(How disposed of)

(Action completed)	(Index)
98/11/11	14/9/66

Next Paper

E 10057

(Minutes.)

This very interesting plan has been in our minds during the discussions of the official Committee on Palestine. It fits in with the F.O. suggestion that civil administration should be terminated at an early date and the military withdrawn into enclaves.

M. S. Denis
Nov. 5

BASIS
2.11

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*Letter E
1002*

UNITED KINGDOM DELEGATION TO THE UNITED NATIONS
EMPIRE STATE BUILDING
NEW YORK 1, N. Y.

TELEPHONE:
LONGACRE 5-2070

E 9933

18th October, 1947.

24 OCT

My dear Peter,

With reference to your telegram
No 3536, I am sending you a copy of a very
interesting memorandum prepared here by
MacGillivray. A copy is also being sent to
the Colonial Office.

My comments will follow by the
next Bag.

Yours ever,

Harold

I.P. Garran, Esq.,
Eastern Department,
Foreign Office,
Downing Street,
LONDON, S.W.1.

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TOP SECRET

Withdrawal from Palestine

The practical problems and the financial, military and economic considerations involved in a withdrawal of British Administration and troops are of such magnitude and consequence that it may be extremely difficult to determine at short notice, (i.e. within the next few weeks) without due deliberation and full consultation with the various Government departments and commercial interests concerned, a date for final withdrawal from the whole of Palestine which we might not later be forced by circumstances to postpone; in any case it could not be an early date without incurring financial and economic losses to British interests, commercial and Government. It should be possible, however, to withdraw at very short notice from a selected part or selected parts of Palestine without any great practical difficulty and without serious economic or financial loss. Moreover, it would, no doubt, be regarded by the military authorities as strategically dangerous to attempt to hold the whole country until the last day of the necessarily protracted period required for withdrawal of the large body of troops now in Palestine; the country can only with difficulty be kept under control by the presence of the present large number of troops and security conditions would be bound to deteriorate *pari passu* with their dilution; both Arabs and Jews would attempt to seize control of certain areas as soon as our forces in those areas reached a level at which they could no longer effectively resist such attempts; we should then be embroiled in conflict with the whole population of Palestine and possibly also with the neighbouring States. It is assumed, therefore, that, both on military grounds and also so that some early action may be announced as an earnest of intention to withdraw, it is necessary and desirable to proceed by territorial stages. This note is based on that assumption. It is also assumed in this note that there will be no United Nations authority to whom the administration of the country could be handed over.

2. It may be agreed that, in determining the extent and in selecting the precise areas for the first stage of withdrawal, the following objectives should be in mind:-

(a) The fixing of the earliest possible date for effect to be given to this first stage of withdrawal. To achieve this the areas should not include extensive military establishments ~~on~~ Palestine Government property (including enemy properties) which must take some time to liquidate.

(b) The speed at which subsequent withdrawals could be carried out should not be prejudiced. Principal communications leading to the ports should not therefore be included.

(c) Minimum financial loss to the British Government and British commercial interests. The pipeline and refinery and, where possible, British banks and other commercial establishments should not fall within the areas selected. Sufficient citrus land should be excluded as would enable at least a considerable portion of agreed deliveries to the United Kingdom this winter to be undertaken. Valuable Government properties, the realisation of which at market values may take some time, should be excluded where possible. So should property vested in the Custodians of Enemy Property to account for which to the Inter Allied Reparations Agency His Majesty's Government as mandatory Power is responsible.

/(d) The

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(d) The provision of experience from this small scale operation, for guidance in subsequent stages of greater consequence, of the practical difficulties arising from withdrawal.

(e) The protection and accommodation, until arrangements can be made for their transfer from Palestine, of the hundreds of Germans who are still interned there.

(f) The creation of conditions which will minimise racial conflict. For this purpose two areas should be selected, one predominantly Arab and the other predominantly Jewish. They should not be contiguous and should contain the smallest possible minority, populations and interests, so that it may be safeguarded from attack from neighbouring Arab countries the Jewish area should be surrounded on its land frontiers by areas which would remain under British control during the period of this first stage.

(g) The creation of conditions which will minimise the inevitable disruption of social and economic life within the areas concerned. The areas should, so far as possible, be self-sufficing in foodstuffs and other immediate necessities and such that temporary administrations can at once be set up by their inhabitants.

(h) A solution, in so far as the United Kingdom is concerned, of the problem of illegal immigration. This is particularly necessary on account of the threat of large scale further illegal immigration in the very near future and the fact that little accommodation remains in Cyprus. If the Jewish area were to contain some coastline and if we were to announce that during the whole period of withdrawal illegal immigration into areas for the administration of which we were still responsible would be resisted with all the forces at our command, all illegal ships would no doubt be diverted to the area of coastline under Jewish control. The Jews themselves would then have the problem of placing checks on immigration as soon as it reached such proportions that they were unable to cope with the concomitant problems of resettlement.

(i) A lessening of Middle East tension deriving from the dynastic rivalries of Arab States, by means of a settlement of the burning issue of the authority which is to assume control over the Arab areas of Palestine. The authority which would obtain control over the Arab area from which we withdrew in the first stage might be able there to establish itself so firmly and with such general Arab assent that it would be accepted by the Arab States as the proper authority to take over the other Arab areas of Palestine in due course and would be accorded the position of recognised spokesman for the Arabs of all Palestine in subsequent negotiations with the Jews and the British Government as to the future administration of Palestine.

(j) The creation of conditions which will promote a mutual accommodation between Arabs and Jews throughout Palestine and the establishment of responsible Palestinian Arab and Jewish authorities by whom negotiations could be conducted with popular assent. This might lead to a satisfactory political settlement before the completion of withdrawal by Great Britain from the rest of the country. If such settlement were to be achieved through the good offices of Great Britain, treaty relations with the future independent State or States set up in Palestine might follow or become part of such settlement. The creation of a small Jewish area into which immigrants could flow freely and in which the Jewish authorities would be immediately and fully occupied in the resettlement of these immigrants and with problems arising from an economic position which must inevitably deteriorate rapidly in proportion to the number of indigent Jewish refugees admitted would bring about such a radical change in the basic causes of Arab-Jewish conflict within a period which might be as short as two months that a political settlement without blood letting might well become attainable.

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- 3 -

3. With the above objectives in mind the following two areas are suggested for the first stage of withdrawal.

(1) A Jewish area along the coast from Caesarea to Tel Aviv stretching inland almost to, but not including any part of, the Haifa-Lyddah railway line. Nor would it include Lydda airport, the source of the Jerusalem water supply at Ras el Ain, and the German settlement of Wilhelma where the majority of Germans were interned. The whole of this area is already largely Jewish and includes the terrorist centres of Tel Aviv, Nathanya, Petah Tiqwa, Ramat Gan and Hadera. It contains the most advanced and richest Jewish local authorities and there should be no difficulty in handing over to them the responsibility for the administration of these areas. The Jewish quarters of Jaffa should be included; otherwise they would become centres of disturbance within the area still administered by the Palestine Government.

(2) The Sub-districts of Gaza, Beersheba and Hebron. The population figures for this area are as follows:-

Arabs	340, 310
Jews	4, 350

It contains three all-Arab municipalities which could become the centre of an Arab administration. Gaza (38,000), Hebron (26,000) and Beersheba (6,500). But it is predominantly rural and should be self-sufficing in food-stuffs. If there should be delays in the evacuation of the large military stores depot at Rafah and the Armoured Division camps around Nuseirat, that part of the Gaza sub-district south of Gaza town could be omitted from the first stage and withdrawal therefrom eventually effected southwards through Sinai.

4. In announcing such a plan it would be desirable to explain at the outset that, in order to avoid conflict with Arabs and Jews and so as to maintain law and order up to the last in areas which His Majesty's Government was still administering, it was necessary to withdraw by territorial stages and that the selection of areas for the first stage was dictated by a desire to minimize the chances of conflict between the two peoples. The announcement of the areas to be evacuated initially should not be made so far in advance of the date fixed as to permit of action by Arabs or Jews designed to frustrate our objectives; nor at such short notice as would not afford members of minority groups in the respective areas the opportunity of moving out before the fixed date, seven days might be a sufficient period of notice.

5. The plan will, of course, be criticised by the Arab on the grounds that we are facilitating unlimited immigration in the Middle East and protecting it from Arab attack, and by the Jews that we are depriving them of the Negev in the face of the recommendation of the U.N.S.C.O.P. that it should be theirs.

DCM.
16/10/47.

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Reference:- **FO 371/61960**

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Mr. CHIFLEY. - The United Kingdom Government knew that my viewpoint was not necessarily that of the Australian Government. I was of the opinion that the drain on British man-power and money was too great and that, accordingly, the Palestine mandate should be handed back, either to the League of Nations or to the United Nations, whichever body was regarded as having responsibility for it. The subject has not been discussed by the United Kingdom and Australian Governments. The Minister for External Affairs, who knew my views, was also present at the Prime Ministers' conference when my personal opinions on the matter were expressed. The subject has not been discussed by Cabinet. Finally, the Australian Government was not asked for its concurrence in the proposal to withdraw from Palestine. It was, however, kept fully informed of the intentions of the United Kingdom Government in the matter and, when the decision to withdraw was finally announced, the Australian Government offered no objection to it.

EXTRACT FROM COMMONWEALTH PARLIAMENTARY
DEBATES - HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES -
WEDNESDAY, 1ST OCTOBER, 1947.

UNITED NATIONS ORGANISATION.

Mr. LANG. - Has the attention of the Prime Minister been drawn to a cablegram from New York published in the Melbourne "Age" of Friday last purporting to outline the views of the Australian Delegation on matters now before the General Assembly of the United Nations Organisation? The cablegram contains the following statement:-

That Australia delegation is said to think that, in any circumstances, the main burden of carrying the Palestinian solution will fall on the British Forces, and it is not outside the realm of possibility that even Australia may be asked to contribute troops.

Does that statement represent the considered view of the Government? Have any instructions been issued to the Australian Delegation regarding the attitude it is to adopt in the event of the General Assembly deciding to send troops to Palestine?

Mr. CHIFLEY. - I have not seen the article mentioned by the honourable member. The statement he has quoted has no foundation in fact. No such instructions have been given to the Australian Delegation. I and the Minister for External Affairs, who is the leader of the Delegation, understand quite clearly what the views of this Government are regarding Palestine. As the honourable member knows, this is a very delicate and difficult subject. Great Britain has been carrying the burden in the policing of Palestine. For that it has received little thanks; in fact, it has received a great deal of abuse. Although a great deal of advice has been tendered to the United Kingdom as to how it should do the job nobody else has been anxious to provide either men or money to carry out the task. I have discussed with the Minister for External Affairs the position in Palestine as it affects Australia and the United Nations Committee which is now considering this problem will, I presume, give consideration to all suggestions that may be made to the Assembly. One thing that I can tell the honourable member is that, so far as this Government is concerned, no Australian troops will be sent to Palestine. Of that, the honourable member can be completely confident and, in addition, he can rest assured that we will be making no contribution to the work of administration in Palestine.

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1947		Palestine	E10133 /G
1 31		EASTERN	500 65
E10133 19323/C		Strategic & military problems in connection with Transjordan should Palestine mandate be surrendered.	
Col Naddon H/Def to Mr Burrows COS 1260/29/10/7 dated 29 00 Received 30 00.		AP (47) 136 (Final)	
Last Paper		(Minutes)	
References		<p><i>[Signature]</i> (J.E. CABLER) 31/10</p>	
E9411/9343/31			
(Print)			
<p><i>[Signature]</i></p>			
(How disposed of)			
<p>Y) Sir A. Kirk Amman from Mr Burrows Dec 3</p>		<p>This is a useful paper. It does not call for any specific action at this stage but the various considerations dealt with herein should be taken into account in considering the question of the Arab Region and our general attitude towards Transjordan (see separate minute).</p> <p>The paper also envisages the eventual development and expansion of ^{military} facilities now being in Transjordan but emphasises that inadequacy of communications etc make this impossible in the immediate future.</p> <p>The paper recommends, however, for consideration, that to ensure the security and stability of the country, a token force of a small number of aircraft and</p>	
(Action completed)	(Index)		
<p><i>[Signature]</i></p>	<p><i>[Signature]</i></p>		
Next Paper			

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for withdrawal from
Palestine.

If the C.O.S. see no objection, I suggest that a copy of this paper (suitably edited, if necessary) be sent to Sir A. Kirkbride for his information.

R. G. Garrison
5/21

I think we should encourage the COS to keep as large a "token" force as is convenient in Transjordan.

6. *James*

Submitted to the Secretary of State
with E-10206 ^{7/30/80} / 95431, which please see.

LP/
20/11

A copy, 'tipped tailed', may be sent to Truman
off letter to cover hereafter ^{his} ~~his~~ ^{Waller} ~~Waller~~ ^(initials) 1/12/22

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FO 371 / 61960



Tel. No. : Whitehall 7000

TOP SECRET

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REFERENCE: C.O.S. 1260/29/10/7.

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MINISTRY OF DEFENCE,
GREAT GEORGE STREET,
29th October, 1947 S.W.1

*enter E16
soon*

E10133

Dear Burrows,

I am writing with reference to your letter (No. E.9411/9373/31) dated 11th October, 1947, asking for the views of the Chiefs of Staff on certain strategic and military problems which will arise in connection with Transjordan, should His Majesty's Government decide to surrender the Mandate for Palestine and to withdraw British administration and British forces.

I attach a copy of a report by the Joint Planning Staff (J.P.(47)136(Final)) with which the Chiefs of Staff are in agreement, subject to the incorporation of a number of amendments which have been noted in the attached copy, and have instructed me to send a copy to the Foreign Office as an expression of their views.

Yours sincerely

W. D. D. D.

B.A.B. Burrows, Esq.,
Foreign Office.

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THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT

The circulation of this paper has been strictly limited.

It is issued for the personal use of Mr Burrows.

TOP SECRET

Copy No. 48

Circulated for the consideration of the ~~Council~~ of Staff

J.P. (47) 136 (Final)

24th October, 1947.

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

JOINT PLANNING STAFF

TRANSJORDAN - STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE: MILITARY
IMPLICATIONS OF BRITISH WITHDRAWAL FROM PALESTINE.

Report by the Joint Planning Staff.

In anticipation of instructions we have examined a letter⁺ from the Foreign Office requesting the views of the Chiefs of Staff on certain strategic and military problems which will arise in connection with Transjordan, should His Majesty's Government decide to surrender the Mandate for Palestine and to withdraw the British administration and British forces.

2. The Foreign Office point out that one of the problems arising from our possible withdrawal from Palestine is that of the future strategical position of Transjordan. King Abdullah is apprehensive about the position of Transjordan once the British administration and British forces no longer exist in Palestine. The Foreign Office consider that it will be necessary to discuss the future position of Transjordan with King Abdullah in the near future.

The Foreign Office have set out in their letter certain specific questions on which they request the views of the Chiefs of Staff. We answer each of these questions below.

Question 1.

3. "Would withdrawal from Palestine affect the importance which we attach to Transjordan from the strategical point of view? Can it make any considerable contribution to the military problems with which we shall be faced if we cannot retain facilities in either Egypt or Palestine?"

Answer

Answer
4. The strategic importance of Transjordan lies in the fact that

(a) It is traversed by all the direct communications connecting Persia and Iraq with the vital central area - viz Egypt and Palestine.

+ C.O.S.(47)218(0)

6-1

(b) It lies either on or adjacent to the two main strategic lines of approach to Palestine and Egypt from the north east.

(c) It is the only remaining Arab State in which, by Treaty, we still enjoy very extensive freedom of movement and one which has always been definitely pro British

5. We have recently stated that even if we are forced or decide to evacuate Egypt and Palestine we shall still need to retain the ability to re-enter these countries in an emergency as, without such ability, our Middle East strategy falls to the ground. Provided we obtain the ability to re-enter our withdrawal from Palestine will not affect the importance which we attach to Transjordan from the strategic point of view.

6. With regard to the contribution Transjordan can make to the Military problems with which we shall be faced if we cannot retain facilities in either Egypt or Palestine, under our existing Treaty with Transjordan we are permitted to station forces in the country and use facilities and communications for their maintenance. We also enjoy transit and other rights in the country.

It might well be necessary to consider the possibility of the extensive development of Transjordan so that we could use it as a jumping off ground to effect the early re-introduction of forces into Palestine in an emergency. Under these circumstances, the strategic importance of Transjordan would be enhanced.

7. As it is at present, however, the difficult nature of the country, the indifferent communications and the position and inadequacy of the only port of Aqaba, all limit the use that could be made of the country for military purposes.

Further, the airfields are at present quite inadequate for forces of any size. Amman, the only one where permanent buildings on any scale exist, is incapable for topographical reasons of enlargement to permit the operation of the latest types of military aircraft; Mafraq, which has the space, lacks all but a few temporary buildings, and would need both extension and drainage; what other landing grounds there are exist for use in emergency only and possess no facilities. It is therefore clear that, in addition to the administrative difficulties of maintaining air forces in the country, considerable financial expenditure would be necessary before more than very small forces could be located in Transjordan.

8. From the long term point of view, it might be possible, by development of the Port of Aqaba, the airfields and the internal communications, to increase the value of the country for stationing forces and locating stores. A project

ø J.P.(47) 135

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for the development of Transjordan would require detailed study before it could be decided upon and in general it is clear ~~that~~ from the nature of the country and the "bottle-neck" at Aqaba that such development would be a very considerable undertaking. Further, by reason of Aqaba's position at the head of a narrow gulf dominated on one side by Saudi Arabian territory, it is clear that, if the port is to be used in war, this will entail some measure of military assistance to Saudi Arabia to secure the gulf.

9. For all the above reasons we consider that Transjordan without extensive development can make little or no contribution to ease the wider Military problems consequent on our withdrawal from Palestine.

10. It should, however, be possible if deemed politically desirable to maintain small forces in the country by making strictly limited use of Amman and other airfields.

For this reason, apart from the possibility of the extensive development referred to above, we wish to retain the rights we enjoy under the existing Treaty.

11. Concerning oil, a considerable section of the pipelines from Iraq to Haifa run in Transjordan territory and there is a possibility that other pipelines to be constructed at a later date may also most conveniently cross Transjordan. Further, if Haifa, for any reason, were permanently denied to us as an oil terminal, Transjordan might assume additional importance in view of the possibility of a terminal at Aqaba. *An oil concession has been granted to the Petroleum Development (Transjordan) Company, and if oil is discovered the strategic value of the country would be further enhanced.*

12. "To what extent would our withdrawal from Palestine affect the ability of Transjordan to maintain itself as an Independent State?"

Answer.

13. We understand that the most serious potential threat to Transjordan's ability to maintain itself as an independent State would arise from the spread of Communist influence were Russia to be allowed to participate in the administration of Palestine after our withdrawal. The Foreign Secretary has suggested⁺ that Soviet intentions go even further than this and that they hope for the establishment of a Communist State in Palestine, or at least in Jewish areas, which would be organised by Communist - indoctrinated illegal immigrants from Eastern Europe. Potential but less serious threats to the integrity of Transjordan are presented by the existence of political difficulties with Syria, over the Greater Syria question, and with Saudi Arabia over the territorial disputes relating to Aqaba and Maan. Although in present circumstances there would not appear to be any immediate threat to Transjordan either from the adjacent Arab countries or from any Jewish State that may be set up in the area, our withdrawal from

+ Foreign Office Tel.No.10880 of 21st October

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Palestine will inevitably place Transjordan in a less secure position, *assuming that partition of Palestine will be carried out and that amalgamation between Transjordan and Arab Palestine will not take place.*

14. In our opinion any threats which may develop against Transjordan can best be countered by the maintenance of a strong and stable regime backed by effective indigenous armed forces and by definite evidence that H.M.G. continues to maintain an interest in the country. Since the existence of the Arab Legion is dependent upon the annual subsidy which H.M.G. pays to the Transjordan Government under Article 5 of the Treaty, we consider it most important that this subsidy is continued after our withdrawal from Palestine.

Although we appreciate that the best evidence of our continued interest in Transjordan would be the permanent presence of British forces in the country, administrative difficulties preclude this at the present time, to anything other than an extremely limited force. With the lessons of 1924 before us, it is for consideration that even a token force consisting of a small number of aircraft and possibly some armoured cars might have a great influence on the security and the stability of the country. Irrespective of the possibility of maintaining such a force, an increased interest in and assistance towards the training of the armed forces of the country, including the provision of British officers, would be of great value. This is further discussed in answer to Question 4 below. In addition if it became necessary in the long term to develop the port of Aqaba, this would be a further indication of our continued interest in the country.

Should the suggestion made by Field Marshal Smuts* that some form of amalgamation of Transjordan and Arab Palestine should be effected, be implemented, then the economic and strategic strength of Transjordan would be considerably increased.

*Letter of 20th October to the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations.

16. At present only a small number of British Military personnel are permanently stationed in Transjordan. British Army personnel who are permanently stationed in the country are either seconded or under private contracts to the Arab Legion. There is a small R.A.F. establishment at Amman. At present forces from Palestine visit the country from time to time for training under active service conditions. Accommodation and administrative facilities are extremely limited and it would not, therefore, be practicable for any appreciable forces to be located in the country on our withdrawal from Palestine without extensive developments. These would take

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Palestine will inevitably place Transjordan in a less secure position, *assuming that partition of Palestine will be carried out and that amalgamation between Transjordan and Arab Palestine will not take place.*

14. In our opinion any threats which may develop against Transjordan can best be countered by the maintenance of a strong and stable regime backed by effective indigenous armed forces and by definite evidence that H.M.G. continues to maintain an interest in the country. Since the existence of the Arab Legion is dependent upon the annual subsidy which H.M.G. pays to the Transjordan Government under Article 5 of the Treaty, we consider it most important that this subsidy is continued after our withdrawal from Palestine.

Although we appreciate that the best evidence of our continued interest in Transjordan would be the permanent presence of British forces in the country, administrative difficulties preclude this at the present time, to anything other than an extremely limited force. With the lessons of 1924 before us, it is for consideration that even a token force consisting of a small number of aircraft and possibly some armoured cars might have a great influence on the security and the stability of the country. Irrespective of the possibility of maintaining such a force, an increased interest in and assistance towards the training of the armed forces of the country, including the provision of British officers, would be of great value. This is further discussed in answer to Question 4 below. In addition if it became necessary in the long term to develop the port of Aqaba, this would be a further indication of our continued interest in the country.

Question 3.

15. "Will our withdrawal from Palestine involve stationing more or fewer British forces in Transjordan and how will such forces be maintained?"

Answer.

16. At present only a small number of British Military personnel are permanently stationed in Transjordan. British Army personnel who are permanently stationed in the country are either seconded or under private contracts to the Arab Legion. There is a small R.A.F. establishment at Amman. At present forces from Palestine visit the country from time to time for training under active service conditions. Accommodation and administrative facilities are extremely limited and it would not, therefore, be practicable for any appreciable forces to be located in the country on our withdrawal from Palestine without extensive developments. These would take

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a considerable time to complete. There is, however, the possibility of locating a token force as suggested in paragraph 14 above in the existing R.A.F. accommodation.

In the short term, therefore, our withdrawal from Palestine will not cause any appreciable change in the number of military personnel permanently stationed in Transjordan, but the training of British forces in the country would cease.

The administration of the small number of military personnel involved, which could be carried out through Aqaba, should present no difficulties.

Question 4.

17. "What would be the future of the Arab Legion on our withdrawal from Palestine on the assumption that the Arab Legion units now in Palestine would have to be withdrawn into Transjordan?"

Answer

18. The Arab Legion forms the Army and the police force of Transjordan. Its commanding Officer is Glubb Pasha, who is not a member of H.M. Forces but is seconded from the Palestine Government. There are other British Officers in the Legion, some seconded from the British Army, some from the Palestine Government, others under contract with the Transjordan Government. H.M.G. are bound by their Treaty obligations with the Transjordan Government to afford financial assistance in meeting the cost of all military forces. To this end H.M.G. pays a regular subsidy to the Transjordan Government.

At present the greater part of the Legion is lent to the Palestine Government and operates under the G.O.C.-in-C., in Palestine, for which services we are paying the Transjordan Government an additional sum.

19. Assuming that the Arab Legion was withdrawn from Palestine, we consider that it should become the main component of the armed forces of Transjordan and its size adjusted to this role. As we have said, we consider it important to the maintenance of our position in the Middle East that we should continue to assist and even increase such assistance in the training and maintenance of this force. To this end we consider that we should continue to subsidise the force and to provide British officers and the necessary training facilities. After complete withdrawal from Palestine has been effected, the supply of arms and equipment to the Arab Legion might have to be carried out through the port of Aqaba which is capable now of taking that amount of traffic.

20. At the moment we employ 15 Garrison Companies of the Arab Legion on guarding installations in Palestine, and the greater part of the Mechanised Brigade on Internal Security. It is possible that some of these Garrison Companies could be usefully employed, after our withdrawal from Palestine, to guard our installations elsewhere in the Middle East. Such use should not however be made of the Transjordanian man power to the detriment of the Arab Legion in its role as the national Army of Transjordan.

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20. We suggest that the War Office, in consultation with the Foreign Office and the Treasury, be invited to assess the appropriate size and composition of the Arab Legion for its role as the national army of Transjordan, *and to consider the need and desirability of continuing to employ a proportion of the Garrison Companies for guard duties.*

Question 5.

22. "If fighting broke out in Palestine as a result of our withdrawal and King Abdullah wished to use the Arab Legion there, what attitude should we adopt?"

Answer.

23. In such a situation the action to be taken would be one entirely for political decision. We suggest, however, that under these circumstances we should probably be compelled albeit, reluctantly, to stop the subsidy and order the British personnel seconded to the Legion to stand down from any Military action. We do not think that this will have any effect on our long-term relations with the Arab States.

In this connection we would emphasise that, from the military point of view, it would be unacceptable to attempt to disarm such units of the force as are still in Palestine at the time of our withdrawal, since such action would not only involve a considerable military commitment, but in addition would have far reaching and adverse repercussions on our relations with all the Arab States.

Question 6.

24. "What would be the future of the Transjordan Frontier Force?"

Answer

25. This force is now being renamed the Palestine Frontier Force. It is an armed gendarmerie and is a Colonial force recruited in Palestine under a Palestine Ordinance; it is however under the operational control of the War Office. The greater part are Arabs from Transjordan and other tribes outside Palestine.

Should British Civil administration in Palestine be terminated without handing over to a succeeding authority the Force would have no legal status and could not be retained. Steps would, therefore, have to be taken to disband it before the administration is terminated.

26. In the event of our turning the mandate over to another authority and, provided that the legal position regarding the terms of service could be overcome, the

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Palestine Frontier Force might be made available to the succeeding authority. It is likely, however, that in such circumstances the force would become unreliable and attempt to desert with their weapons. We are, therefore, doubtful of the wisdom of attempting to retain the force in being even in these circumstances.

28. In either case, therefore, we consider that it would be necessary to effect the disbandment and disarming of the Palestine Frontier Force as soon as possible after the date of our withdrawal from Palestine has been decided.

Recommendation

28. We recommend that:-

- (a) This paper be used as a reply to the Foreign Office.
- (b) The War Office, in consultation with the Foreign Office and the Treasury be invited to assess the appropriate size and composition of the Arab Legion for its role as national army of Transjordan.

(Signed) J.F. STEVENS
J.H.N. POETT
G.H. MILLS.

Ministry of Defence, S.W.1.

24th October, 1947.

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NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

(13555) Wt. 43698-114 200m 2/47 G.S.S. Gp. 620

Registry
No. E 1033/9373/6

Top Secret.
Secret
Confidential.
Restricted.
Open.

Draft.

Sir Keith
Amman

from
B.A.B.
in Buenos

SP. (47) 136 (Final)
(omit heading, number
foot notes and
para 28, with ending)
(omit para 11, with ending)
(omit para 12, with ending)
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Resubmit all
notes

RECEIVED IN DIVISION
3 DEC 1947
SENT BY TYPE
15. 11.
DEPATCHED 4/12.

~~Top Secret~~ December 30. 3m
75
for your personal reference ~~Top Secret~~ information
I enclose a copy of
dated Oct 24th 1947,
a paper which has been
generally approved by the
Chiefs of Staff, on the strategic
importance of Transjordan and
the military implications of our
withdrawal from Palestine. It
is very top secret and I
shall be glad if you will make
no use of it in any ~~own~~ dealings
you may have with ~~the~~ ^{our} military
authorities.

We have received your
Chamcy's letter No S/1008/47 of Nov
18th containing a record of a conver-
sation you had with the AOC Levant,
para 4 of which seems to tie up with
para 14 of the enclosed paper. With
yours

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Reference:-
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371 / 61960

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FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1. 76

3rd December, 1947.

(E 10133/9373/G)

TOP SECRET

Dear Kirkbride

I enclose for your personal and top secret information, a copy of a paper dated the 24th October, 1947, which has been generally approved by the Chiefs of Staff, on the strategic importance of Transjordan and the military implications of our withdrawal from Palestine. It is very top secret and I shall be glad if you will make no use of it in any dealings you may have with our military authorities.

We have received your Chancery's letter No.8/1008/47 of the 18th November containing a record of a conversation you had with the A.O.C. Levant, paragraph 4 of which seems to tie up with paragraph 14 of the enclosed paper.

(Signed) (B.A.B. Burrows)

Sir Alec Kirkbride, C.M.G., O.B.E.,
Amman.

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Reference:-

FO 371 / 61960

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1947

PALESTINE

E 10146

3 OCT

Registry
Number

FROM

No.

Dated

Received
in Registry

E10146/9373/31

E.O.

found.

29 Oct

31 -

Use of Transjordan Forces in Palestine.
 Attached copy of note of an interview between
 Brodetsky and Linton of the Jewish Agency,
 and copy of telegram no 238 to H/C
 Palestine, Brodetsky protested against the
 use of the Arab Legion as guard duties in
 Palestine and said they should be returned
 to Transjordan. Paper list of further points
 discussed.

Last Paper.

10144

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Action
completed.)

(Index)

J.C. 7/11

14/9/48

Next Paper.

10147

32003 F.O.P.

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Reference:-
FO 371 / 61960

An obvious tactical move by Messrs Brodetsky
 & Linton. I think we can leave it to the G.O.C.
 to work this out with the High Commissioners.
 The Arab Legion forces will, I should think,
 be indispensable to us so long as we are
 responsible for law & order in Palestine.

R. G.
 J. G. G.
 3/11

BAZ 3
 6-11

E
enter
78

Colonial Office,
Downing Street,
29.10.1947.

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Reference:-

371 / 61960

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79

75872/154/19/47

I enclose for your information copies of a note of an interview between Brodetsky and Linton of the Jewish Agency and myself and of our covering saving telegram to the High Commissioner.

You will of course see that one of the main points made by Brodetsky was that the units of the Arab Legion now employed by us on guard duties should be returned to Trans-Jordan. I quite realise that you would be very reluctant to see them leave Palestine where they are urgently needed and cannot be replaced, but I feel that there is perhaps something in the Jewish Agency's protests.

No doubt the High Commissioner will consult the General Officer Commanding before replying to us, but we should be grateful for your views also as to the possibility of returning the units to Trans-Jordan as soon as the security situation permits.

For my own part I am inclined to think that the matter might be satisfactorily settled by some rearrangement of the troops inside Palestine under which they were put in less controversial areas.

1/

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL M.M. CHARTERIS.

CONFIRMED BY THE PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

FO 371 / 61960

40

I am sending a copy of this letter and enclosures to Beith at Foreign Office for his information.

James Samesh

(Sd) *Tristram Smith*

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Reference:-

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81

PALESTINE

PALESTINE

29th October, 1947.

238

PRIORITY

Repeated His Majesty's Minister, Amman.

I enclose for your information a note of an interview between Professor Brodetsky and Mr. Linton of the Jewish Agency and officials of the Colonial Office on October 22nd.

2. You will, of course, see that the Agency representatives' main purpose was:

- (a) to lodge a protest against the continued employment in Palestine of the Arab Legion;
- (b) to raise the question of the future of the Trans-Jordan Frontier Forces;
- (c) to seek assurance that nothing would be done in the event of a British withdrawal which would prejudice Jewish security and rights;
- (d) to solicit His Majesty's Government's support for the majority plan of U.N.S.C.O.P.

30/

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Reference: - **FO** 371 / 61960

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to/

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Saving.

From the Secretary of State for the Colonies.

To the Officer Administering the Government of.....

Date.....

No.....Saving.

to you by the Jewish Agency in Palestine, and I should be grateful for your views on the whole question and especially as to the lines along which a reply to his representations can be made to Brodetsky.

5. The Trans-Jordan Frontier Force being an Imperial force and raised in Palestine, is of course in a quite different position from that of the Arab Legion. No doubt you have already given preliminary consideration to the future of the force along with other details of the withdrawal. If it becomes necessary to disband it suitable precautions can presumably be taken to ensure that its arms and equipment are surrendered to the proper authorities in good time. In the meantime we are of course fully justified in using the Force as we see fit.

6. The suggestion that the Jewish settlement police should be double seems to have been only a tactical move.

7. As regards the final position that will result from the British withdrawal, it seems desirable to avoid any action that might appear to show partiality to either side.

SECR.

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COLONIAL OFFICE

84

RECORD OF AN INTERVIEW BETWEEN REPRESENTATIVES OF
THE JEWISH AGENCY AND MEMBERS OF THE MIDDLE EAST
DEPARTMENT ON OCTOBER 22.

Professor Brodetsky and Mr Linton of the Jewish Agency came to see Mr Trafford Smith and Mr Fitzgerald at 3.00 o'clock. They had asked to see Sir Thomas Lloyd, but Mr Trafford Smith explained that this had not been possible to arrange at such short notice.

Professor Brodetsky said he wished to put certain questions concerning the British withdrawal from Palestine. He sought assurance that HMG would take no action or physical measures that would prejudice the position of the Jewish population. He quoted as an example of troop movements that were causing considerable concern in Palestine: (1) the withdrawal of British troops from the Nash Pina area and their replacement by the Transjordan Frontier Force; (2) concentration of elements of the Arab Legion at Tel Litvinski, near Tel Aviv. He stressed the very unfortunate effect that these moves had had on Jewish opinion, which was already highly excited. There was a serious risk of incidents.

Mr Trafford Smith pointed out that, so far as we knew here, these particular movements, if they had in fact been made, were normal military dispositions and planned entirely without reference to HMG's announcement in regard to withdrawal. Their coincidence with the war-like pronouncements of the Arab leaders in the Lebanon, though unfortunate, was quite accidental. He suggested further that, in view of the general reduction of the British Army, it was only to be expected that the run-down of United Kingdom troops in Palestine would be accelerated.

Mr Linton said that he wished to stress the danger

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of incidents between the Arab troops and the Jewish population. He suggested that we should try and look at the position from the standpoint of a Jewish citizen of Tel Aviv or a settler in the Huleh Basin, who would not unnaturally see an immediate threat to his own security in the presence of these Arab troops. The Jewish population had strong suspicions that the Arabs were being placed in positions of tactical value now, and would thus be able, at the time of the British withdrawal, to threaten the Jewish areas. He emphasized the particular importance of the Rosh Pina area to all the Jewish settlements in North Eastern Galilee.

Both Professor Brodetsky and Mr Linton went on to protest strongly against the use of the Arab Legion and the Transjordan Frontier Force as armed auxiliaries of the British forces in Palestine. The Arab Legion was a foreign, Transjordanian, force employed by the Palestine Government for guard duty but owing its allegiance to King Abdullah. The Transjordan Frontier Force, composed as it was principally of Palestinian Arabs, was wholly in sympathy with the Arab nationalist cause, so far as the feelings of its individual members were concerned, whatever might be its status as an Imperial force. They suggested that in fairness to the Jews the units of the Arab Legion should be removed from Palestine, and that the Transjordan Frontier Force should not be stationed in Jewish zones and in vital areas like Rosh Pina. The Transjordan Frontier Force could not be expected to take firm measures against other Arabs infiltrating across the northern frontier or making trouble in the area. In short, there could be no doubt that both the Arab Legion and the Transjordan Frontier Force were quite untrustworthy in the present political circumstances.

/Mr

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Mr. Trafford Smith said that, though the Arab troops had not been guilty of misconduct in the recent past, he fully appreciated the Jewish Agency's point and undertook to refer the matter to Higher Authority in the Colonial Office and to the High Commissioner. He stressed once more that HMG had not yet made any dispositions for the withdrawal of British administration or troops and had not yet gone further than the stage of preliminary planning. Thus it was quite wrong to interpret these troop movements as a deep-laid plot to station Arab troops in strategic areas and thereby prejudice the future security of the Jewish population. He pointed out that the position of the Arab Legion and the Transjordan Frontier Force would of course have to be considered when detailed arrangements for British withdrawal were being made. As the latter was established under Palestinian law, it would no doubt have to be disbanded. The Jewish Agency could rest assured that it would not be left as a well-armed combatant force capable of using its arms in support of Arab aspirations.

Professor Brodetsky suggested that one of the best ways of keeping order would be to double the Jewish settlement police. Members of the Transjordan Frontier Force, even if it were disbanded, would no doubt get away with a good deal of their arms and equipment, which they would use against the Jews in the event of trouble. It was only fair that the Jews, on their side, should be enabled to increase the forces on which they would have to rely for defence.

Mr. Linton then went on to discuss the wider subject of the attitude of HMG to the majority plan of UN 181. He wondered that HMG had not given a definite indication of its views on the merits of this plan at UN 181, and suggested that HMG should say whether or not they favoured

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Mr. Trafford Smith said that HMG had decided that they would not put forward definite proposals of their own or back any particular plan, at least in the preliminary discussions. Their attitude had been fully defined in the Secretary of State's speeches at UNO.

Professor Brodetsky then urged again that the British withdrawal should not be so designed as to put the Jews at any disadvantage.

Mr Trafford Smith said that the Jewish Agency need have no fears on this point. Present moves could be discounted as withdrawal had not yet been ordered or even finally decided on. Developments at UN might yet bring about a complete change in the situation. In the event of withdrawal, HMG would not wish to favour one side or the other in the process of carrying it out.

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1947

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E 10147

1 OCT

88

PALESTINE

Registry
Number

FROM

No.

Dated

Received
in Registry

E10147/9373/31

Hofford Smith

Colonel Office

to Mr. Bennett

Oct 29

- 31

Time for withdrawal from Palestine
 After 40. letter (E9493/9373/31) is High
 Commissioner estimate of withdrawal time,
 amount to, explanation of H/C's estimates,
 if there is a successful administration of any
 sort, withdrawal could scarcely take place
 without a certain minimum of landing area.
 is an end of the road for the present
 continuity of administration.

Last Paper.

10146

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

J. H. B. (CABRE)
 JH

The High Commissioner has now
~~stated that he could carry on~~
 stated that he could carry on
 for six months covering military
 withdrawal. The pros and
 cons will be dealt with in
 the Official Committee's paper
 for the Defence Committee.

H. J. Beins
 MV 3
 (BEIT 4)

(Action
completed.)

(Index.)

J. S. 10/6/11

10/27/48

Next Paper.

10229

32003 F.O.P

I do not think we will
 pursue

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 371 / 61960

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101011
1011

proceed this independently of the
Defense Office paper.

BAB

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Reference:-

FO 371 / 61960



October 29, 1947. 90

Your Reference

E 10147

31 OCT

Thank you for your letter (ref. E.9493/9373/31) of October 27 about the High Commissioner's estimate of withdrawal time.

I, of course, fully understand the fears you no doubt feel that any handing over process might involve us in settling differences between rival interests, etc., and generally being drawn into precisely those internal conflicts which we wish to avoid. On the other hand, it seems to me that it

/ there

B.A.B. BURROWS, MSQ.

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FO					
371 / 61960					


91
there is a properly recognized body of some kind to hand over to, we can hardly ignore its existence without running into other pitfalls.

If you feel that the above explanation is not sufficient, we will, of course, ask the High Commissioner to set out his reasons more fully in his own way.

Yours sincerely,

Trifford Smith

(Trifford Smith).



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Reference:-

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92

10283

PALESTINE

4 NOV

Registry
Number

FROM

No.

Dated

Received
in Registry

E10283/9373/31

70. Minute

M. Farman

17 Oct

4 Nov

Palestine, Prime Minister's speech on the address
suggests P.M. should simply re-emphasize
the determination of H.M.G. to withdraw
from Palestine in the absence of a settlement
by reiterating the point made by the
Colonial Secretary.

Last Paper.

10279

(Minutes.)

JB NOV. 4

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Action
completed.)

J. S. M. 4/11

(Index)

15/9/48

Next Paper.

10351

32003 F.O.P

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Reference:-

FO 371 / 61960

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Minutes.

Palestine

The P.M.'s speech on the Address.

The Private Secretaries have asked for points in the form of notes which the Prime Minister could use in his speech.

It has been agreed with the C. O.
that the prints on Palestine should be
submitted by the F. O.

The speech would seem to offer an opportunity to re-emphasize our determination to withdraw in the absence of a settlement, by ~~re~~ stating the fundamental points in our policy, as already announced by the Greek forces in New York. There would be no need to go into any greater detail.

510283

4 NOV

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Reference:-

FO

371 / 61960

Minutes.

Incham suggested notes herewith.


R. J. [unclear]
17/x

B. J. [unclear]

The P.M. may require supplementary information: is in progress in New York,
but that C. G. best
be supplied in
up to date form
nearest the date of the
speech.

C. G. [unclear]
17/x

Sent C. G. M.
P.D.



THING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

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Reference:-

FO

371 / 61960

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Eastern Dept.

95

PALESTINE.

Note for the Prime Minister's Speech on the Address

It is suggested that the Prime Minister should *emphly* emphasise the determination of His Majesty's Government to withdraw from Palestine in the absence of a settlement by reiterating the point which the Colonial Secretary has made in his statement before the United Nations:-

- (i) The policy of His Majesty's Government is based on the assumption that they must lay down the mandate under which they have sought for 25 years to discharge their obligation to facilitate the growth of the Jewish national home and to protect the interests of the Arab population.
- (ii) There is only one hypothesis on which we shall continue to administer Palestine, namely that the Jews and Arabs agree, in which case we shall be ready to stay for a limited transitional period to help them put the agreement into effect.
- (iii) If the Assembly fail to agree on a recommendation, or if they recommend a solution which is not acceptable to both the Arabs and the Jews, we shall not feel bound to continue to bear responsibility for administering Palestine until a settlement is implemented and we shall proceed to plan the withdrawal both of the British administration and of the British forces.
- (iv) If the Assembly recommend international enforcement of a settlement which is not agreed by the Arabs and the Jews, we shall consider whether the settlement is sufficiently just and sufficiently easy to enforce to justify our participation in such international administration and such international forces as may be appointed to enforce it.

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FO 371 / 61960

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96

~~PALESTINE~~

**Registry
Number**

FROM

No.

Dated

Received
in Registry

E10351/9373/31

F. O. Minott

W. Carran

14, Oct

6 -

Withdrawal from Palestine
in Paris Times showed telegram from U.S. Consul
General in Jerusalem reporting that in spite of public
statements, Jewish Agency representatives in Palestine
were clearly very nervous indeed at prospect of
withdrawal. Hagana could not be mobilized
and at the same time maintain the economy of
the territory. Jews were greatly aware that they
were dependent for 50% of their food on the Arab market.

Last Paper.

10283

References.

(Minutes.)

g.p.p. 60.61 2549 22/10
~ p'stine 61 1982 24/10

See Jerusalem tel. no. 1982
for the Govt. of Palestine's
reply (last paper in film
jacket)

23.12.1965

R. J. Parman
 V. "X1"

RAC

11. 11

(Action completed.)

(Index

7/6/12/11

15/10/8

Next Paper.

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Reference:-

FO 371 / 61960

The telegram ended with the remark that the Arabs regarded the prospect of our withdrawal as "too good to be true."

The telegram ended with the remark that the Arabs regarded the prospect of our withdrawal as "too good to be true."

R. G. Gamm
14th October, 1947

We should suggest
b/c that they
inform Jerusalem
of this & ask for
comments

Barbara

15-X

Mr. L. A. L. L. L.

10351
5 NOV

Nothing to be Written in this Margin.

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Reference:- FO 371 / 61960

OUTWARD TELEGRAM

INDEXED

98

FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES

75872/154/19/47

Cypher (O.T.P.)

TO PALESTINE (Gen. Sir A. Cunningham)

Sent 22nd October, 1947. 15.15 hrs.

No. 2549 Secret.

Addressed High Commissioner, Palestine.
Repeated UKDEL, New York, for Martin.

Foreign Office have been shown by U.S. Embassy a telegram from U.S. Consul-General in Jerusalem reporting that, in spite of public statements, Jewish Agency extremely nervous at prospect of our withdrawal, and that Haganah officer stated in conversation that it was not possible to mobilise Haganah and at same time maintain economy of country. Telegram added that Yishuv is acutely aware of its dependence for 50% of its food on Arab areas of Palestine and outside sources. Telegram ended with remark that Arabs regarded prospect of withdrawal as "too good to be true".

2. Grateful for your comments on reliability of this assessment of Jewish reaction.

(Copies sent to Foreign Office for transmission to New York)

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FO

371 / 61960

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pw E
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CHINA

10. The following information was obtained from the records of the Department of the Interior, Bureau of Land Management, regarding the land ownership of the area:

D. 24th October, 1947.
R. 24th " " 15.00 hrs.

(Please pass to U.K. DEL as my No. 1462).
Your telegram No. 2549.

Although official Jewish line has been careful to avoid expressing disquiet, it is clear that both the Agency and a considerable part of Yishuv are extremely apprehensive of possible consequences of our withdrawal. Full mobilisation of the Hagana would certainly impair the economy of Yishuv, but the effect of such mobilisation would not be so serious as deprivation of food supplies from Arab areas of Palestine and outside sources. It is approximately correct to say that they depend on these areas and sources for 50% of their food. No doubt Jews could arrange to import the necessary grain supplies from America, but meat shortage would be serious.

2. The words "too good to be true" are a little misleading in suggesting that Arabs are anxious to see the last of us, but fairly reflect the fact that many Arabs still cannot imagine that we intend to withdraw or the consequences to them which would result from our withdrawal. No amount of reiteration of intention will alter their view.

3. The assessment given in your telegram is generally accurate.

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Reference:-

FO

371 / 61960

100

Copies sent to:-

Foreign Office


" "

War Office

" "

M.I.5.

- Mr. Burrows.
- Mr. Garran.
- Mr. Beith.
- Lt.Col. M.M. Charteris.
- Major de Lisle.
- Mr. T.C. Robertson.



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Reference:-

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371 / 61960

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E**1947****PALESTINE****10635****13 NOV**

10)

Registry
Number

FROM

No.

Dated

Received
in Registry

E10635/8373/31

E.O.

Council

13/11/47

*Withdrawal from Palestine.**E.O. to Palestine 2693 of Nov 4**quest list of points arising out of
decision to withdraw from Palestine
is period for which civil administration
should remain, etc.***Last Paper.**

10351

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

92-P.P.	P'stine tel	2084	5/11
-	E.O. tel	2749	8/11
-	P'stine tel	2117	10/11
-	E.O. tel	2681	3/11
-	P'stine tel	4/11	3/11

B.M.V. 14

C.O. letter no. 75872/154/22 14/11

*It was decided to take no action on
this**J 18/11*(Action
completed.)

(Index)

J 16/11

15/11/47

Next Paper.

10986

32003 F.O.P

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FO

371 / 61960

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OUTWARD TELEGRAM

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10635

13 NOV

75872/154/22/47
Cypher (O.T.P.)

TO PALESTINE (General Sir A. Cunningham)

FROM S. OF S., COLONIES.

Sent 4th November, 1947. 21.15 hrs.

IMMEDIATE

No. 2693 Top Secret and Personal. Morning.

Following personal from Trafford Smith. Begins.

S. of S.'s telegram No. 2650. Your telegram No. 2054 has been discussed in Committee and has been of the greatest value.

2. Immediate problem of Committee is as indicated in first sentence of paragraph 2 of my telegram under reference. Conclusions are being embodied in a memorandum to be considered by Defence Committee which Chiefs of Staff will attend on Friday, 7th November.

3. Gibson attended sessions yesterday and today and explained your views in detail. His presence has been of the greatest assistance and this telegram has been drafted in collaboration with him.

4. Major bone of contention has been period for which civil administration should remain. Foreign Office view was that this should not exceed two months. War Office and Air Ministry felt that so short a period might handicap concentration and withdrawal of Services. It is therefore being suggested to Ministers that a further appreciation should be sought from Chiefs of Staff as to repercussions on Service planning of withdrawal of civil government

(a)/

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(a) on 1st February, 1948; (b) on 1st May, 1948. This will necessarily involve reference to C.'s in C., Middle East, who will shortly be asking G.O.C. for his views. We have represented your views as being that a longer period should be set than that envisaged by the Foreign Office.

- (a) in order to allow maximum time for communities to reach some agreement or at least for some arrangements to be made in collaboration with Municipal and local authorities to minimise breakdown of essential services;
- (b) to facilitate concentration of withdrawal of Services.

5. In connection with this further appreciation to be sought from Chiefs of Staff the question will be considered of the withdrawal of the Services into enclaves pending a final evacuation. There is general agreement that enclaves including Lydda and Haifa will be necessary and Service authorities may suggest larger enclaves as first stage. These would be under an ad hoc military administration which would make no attempt at full scale government but would restrict itself to problems of evacuation and preservation of British interests. As regards Jerusalem enclave, your views, including your suggestion for an international body assisted by British police, are being fully reported in an annexure to the memorandum. It appears however that opposition is likely to be considerable both from the Foreign Office and from the Chiefs of Staff, on the grounds that the retention of British troops in Palestine for this purpose might incur the hostility of the Arab world, since it would probably be interpreted as an attempt to assist the Jews to the detriment of Arab interests and that we should thus lose the whole advantage of our withdrawal from Palestine, since however negative a function we might try to fulfil, we should in fact become involved between Arabs and Jews and be the target for criticism and probably for terrorist activities from both sides.

6. With reference to last sentence of paragraph 3 of your telegram No.2054, we should be grateful for your views whether it would be feasible from time to time to reduce the area under civil government pending withdrawal of civil administration. Gibson's present view is that this would not be/

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OUTWARD TELEGRAM

be feasible except insofar as it was forced upon us by the actions of either or both communities and that if we were thus forced to relinquish the control of any substantial part of Palestine it might be better to terminate the civil administration and the Mandate forthwith.

7. The possibility of a Jewish State being set up by way of a coup d'etat following the breakdown of United Nations discussions is mentioned in the memorandum but the attitude which H.M.G. should assume in this event has not yet been studied and will be considered in a further memorandum. We should be grateful for your views on this problem. Gibson considers that it would be impossible for us to recognise the coup d'etat without abandoning the position of neutrality involved in our present policy.

8. The legal implications of the withdrawal of civil government particularly as regards the question of giving legal cover to the forces after withdrawal of civil administration and termination of the Mandate and the question of what, if any, United Kingdom legislation would be appropriate will also be dealt with in a later memorandum. During the next few days discussions between Gibson and the Legal Advisers of the departments concerned will take place on this subject.

9. Committee's present memorandum concludes with recommendation that no announcement in New York of dates either for commencement of withdrawal or for termination of civil government should be authorised pending study of the new Chiefs of Staff appreciation. Ends.

Distributed to:-

R. 243
Secretary of State
Sir T. Lloyd
Mr. Rees-Williams
Sir S. Caine
Sir C. Jeffries
Mr. Holding

Mr. Martin
Mr. Trafford Smith
Mr. Gutch
Mr. Mathieson
Mr. Higham
Mr. Galsworthy
Mr. Holmer
Mr. Gibson

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FROM S. OF S., COLONIES.

Sent 3rd November, 1947. 16.30 hrs.

MOST IMMEDIATE

No. 2681 Top Secret.

Your telegram No. 2054. Last sentence of paragraph 3 as received not understood. Reads "would be on a geographical functional basis". Is this correct.

Distributed to:-

R.243
Secretary of State
Sir T. Lloyd
Mr. Rees-Williams
Sir S. Caine
Sir C. Jeffries
Mr. Holding

Mr. Martin
Mr. Trafford Smith
Mr. Gulch
Mr. Mathieson
Mr. Higham
Mr. Galuworthy
Mr. Fitzgerald
Mr. Gibson

reference:-

371 / 61960

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INWARD TELEGRAM

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Grapher (O.T.P.)

FROM PALESTINE (General Sir A. Cunningham)

TO S. OF S., COLONIES.

D. 3rd November, 1947.

R. 3rd " " 18.35 hrs.

MOST IMMEDIATE

Unnumbered Top Secret and Personal.

Your telegram No. 2681.

My telegram No. 2054 should read "would be on a geographical and not functional basis".

Distributed to:-

R.243
Secretary of State
Sir T. Lloyd
Mr. Rees-Williams
Sir S. Caine
Sir C. Jeffries
Mr. Holding
Mr. Martin

Mr. Trafford Smith
Mr. Gutch
Mr. Mathieson
Mr. Higham
Mr. Galsworthy
Mr. Fitzgerald
Mr. Gibson

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Reference:-

FO

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TO S. OF S. COLONIES.

D. 5th November, 1947.
R. 5th " " 20.55 hrs.

No. 2084 Top Secret and Personal.

Following for Trafford Smith. Beginn

Your telegram No. 2693.

1. Your paragraph 5. Holy Places in Jerusalem are in the main Christian and Arab and the former are in our case. I cannot therefore see how the fact that we intend to ensure their protection could possibly be taken as support for Jews against Arabs. Question is are we prepared to face the Christian world with complete abandonment of the source and centre of their religion? I must repeat therefore again that I cannot be associated with leaving Jerusalem in a vacuum. We could probably put as many as 2,000 British police in Jerusalem so that even if U.N.O. does not take over the City, it might be possible to leave its protection to police only acting under orders of the Military Commander. This would avoid political objections to the presence of "foreign" troops. Paragraph 5. I agree fully with the view of Gibson. Paragraph 7. If Jews set up a Jewish State without U.N.O. approval by a coup d'etat I consider that it would be wrong for us either to recognise it or to transfer to it any of the Services. Clearly if we did so we would be tacitly approving partition and opposing the Arabs. See also paragraph 4 of my telegram No. 2064. If U.N.O. have approved state I still consider that there should be no direct transfer of power to Jews, which should only be carried out through the medium of a U.N.O. Commission.

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reference:-



371 / 61960

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Distributed to:-

R. 243
Secretary of State
Sir T. Lloyd
Mr. Rees-Williams
Sir S. Caine
Sir C. Jeffries
Mr. Holding

Cabinet Offices

" "

Ministry of Defence
Treasury

"

Admiralty

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War Office

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Ministry of Transport

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Air Ministry

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Foreign Office

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"

M.I. 5.

Mr. Martin
Mr. Trafford Smith
Mr. Gutch
Mr. Mathieson
Mr. Higham
Mr. Galsworthy
Mr. Holmer
Mr. Gibson
Mr. S.E.V. Luke.
Brigadier Cornwall-Jones.
Commander Evershed.
Mr. A.J. Newling.
Mr. D.P.C. Hunt.
Mr. W. Russell-Johnson.
Mr. P.E.N. Symott
Captain Maunsell.
Captain D.H. Hall-Thompson.
Mr. G.C.B. Dodds.
Brigadier J.R.C. Hamilton.
Brigadier L.L. Wansbrough-Jones.
Lt. Col. M.M. Charteris.
Mr. B.F. Pickett.
Mr. P.C. Rennie.
Air Commodore Brook.
Group Captain V.H.E. Roth.
Mr. B.A.B. Burrows.
Mr. P. Gerran.
Mr. J.G.S. Beith.
Mr. T.A. Robertson.

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= 5 NOV 1947

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enter

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Cypher (O.T.P.)

FROM S. OF S., COLONIES.

Sent 8th November, 1947. 11.30 hrs.

No. 2749 Top Secret and Personal. Morning.

Your telegram No. 2084.

Withdrawal.

Official Committee is required to consider to what authority or authorities we shall transfer power on our withdrawal. It is hoped to circulate a draft paper on this subject to be discussed by the Committee on Wednesday, 12th November.

2. The problem of handing over to an administration established under the auspices of the United Nations or to an administration agreed upon by Arabs and Jews does not come within the scope of this examination. In default of such arrangements, effective power would no doubt devolve automatically upon whatever authorities were capable of maintaining order in areas of Palestine from which British control had been withdrawn. It is for consideration what such authorities would exist and the extent to which we should wish to assist in the assumption by them of the functions of government.

3. We propose to proceed on the following assumptions:

(a)

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Reference:-

FO 371 / 61960

RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

- (a) if civil government is forced to contract geographically before the date selected for the abandonment of responsibility for civil administration, it would only be from those areas in which the actions of either or both communities made its continuation impracticable. In that event, only services of purely local significance could be handed over to local authorities to run as best they could (paragraph 9 of your telegram No.1889 refers);
 - (b) so long as we are responsible for the civil government of Palestine there can be no question of our recognising the existence of any de facto government set up by Jews or Arabs or the handing over to it of any of the functions of government;
 - (c) in the event of such de facto government being set up in an area where we had relinquished control, we should not attempt to interfere with its actions but should not recognise the right it might claim to extend its authority to areas still under our control.
4. Grateful for your comments on the following aspects of the problem:
- (a) if a predominantly Jewish or predominantly Arab area of Palestine were abandoned by us, as in 3(a) above, can the respective communities be expected to establish some form of effective administration in such area, notwithstanding their lack of political unity, and apart from the question of their inability to do so through lack of control of central services;
 - (b) your estimate with regard to (a), after our responsibility for civil government of Palestine has been abrogated and we remain only in military occupation of certain enclaves;
 - (c) the possibility of the larger towns e.g., Tel Aviv or Nablus using the Municipal machine to conduct a temporary government of their surrounding areas and preserve essential services within them.

FO 371 / 61960

OUTWARD TELEGRAM

5. Please telegraph your views as above and any other observations which may assist the Committee in its examination of this problem to reach me by Monday evening, 10th November.

Distributed to:-

R.243	Mr. Trafford Smith
Secretary of State	Mr. Gutch
Sir T. Lloyd	Mr. Mathieson
Mr. Rees-Williams	Mr. Higham
Sir S. Caine	Mr. Galsworthy
Sir C. Jeffries	Mr. Holmer
Mr. Holding	Mr. Gibson
Mr. Martin	
Cabinet Offices	Mr. S.E.V. Luke.
" "	Brig. Cornwall-Jones.
" "	Cdr. W. Evershed, R.N.
Ministry of Defence	Mr. A.J. Nowling.
Treasury	Mr. D.F.C. Blunt.
"	Mr. W. Russell-Edmonds.
Admiralty	Mr. P.N.N. Synnott.
"	Capt. Maunsell.
"	Capt. D.H. Hall-Thompson.
War Office	Mr. G.C.B. Dodds.
" " (M.O.4.)	Brig. J.R.C. Hamilton.
Ministry of Transport	Brig. L.L. Wansbrough-Jones.
" " "	Lt. Col. M.M. Charteris.
Air Ministry	Mr. B.F. Picknett.
" " "	Mr. F.C. Rennie.
Foreign Office	Air Commodore Brook.
" " "	Group Capt. V.H.B. Roth.
" " "	Mr. B.A.B. Burrows.
" " "	Mr. P. Garrahan.
" " "	Mr. J.G.S. Beith.
M.I.5.	Mr. T.A. Robertson.

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INWARD TELEGRAM INDEXED

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AMENDED COPY (Words added on second page) 13 NOV 1947
Cypher (O.T.P.)

FROM PALESTINE (General Sir A. Cunningham)

TO S. OF S., COLONIES.

D.10th November, 1947.
R.10th " " 15.20 hrs.

MOST IMMEDIATE

No. 2117 Top Secret and Personal.

Your top secret and personal telegram No. 2749.

On the basis given in paragraph 2 of your telegram, there can be no question of transferring legal power to any authority. I fully agree with the assumption in paragraph 3 which reflects our own views. I feel that, on the date on which the Government abrogates its responsibilities, it will be necessary to (?terminate) appointments of all Government officers including Palestinian. There will, therefore, be no part of the Government machine left in any area. If the army require police and railway staff to remain after the above date, their position may, however, require some reconsideration.

2. It should be noted that I would not propose to withdraw administration from any area except in last resort, even at the risk of getting involved in disturbances. The probability is that once one such withdrawal has taken place it would cause general disturbances over all the other areas. The difficulties of withdrawal by areas in such a way as not to bring about virtual partition are constantly before my mind. In fact, I agree fully with paragraph 7 of New York telegram No. 3270 sent me under your No. 2768.

3. It follows, therefore, regarding your paragraph 4 (a) that while it may be possible to establish something approaching to effective administration in the Jewish areas from which withdrawal has taken place, it would be

unlikely/

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371 / 61960

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Reference:- **FO** 371 / 61960

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Distributed to: - /

THE PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

INWARD TELEGRAM

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Distributed to:-

R.243
Secretary of State
Sir T. Lloyd
Mr. Rees-Williams
Sir S. Caine
Sir C. Jeffries
Mr. Holding

Cabinet Offices

" "

Ministry of Defence

Treasury

Admiralty

" "

" "

War Office

" "

Ministry of Transport

" "

Air Ministry

Foreign Office

" "

" "

M.I.5.

Mr. Martin
Mr. Trafford Smith
Mr. Gutch
Mr. Mathieson
Mr. Higham
Mr. Galsworthy
Mr. Holmer
Mr. Gibson
Mr. S.E.V. Luke.
Brigadier Cornwall-Jones.
Commander Evershed.
Mr. A.J. Newling.
Mr. D.F.C. Blunt.
Mr. W. Russell-Edmonds.
Mr. P.N.N. Synnott.
Captain Maunsell.
Captain D.H. Hall-Thompson.
Mr. G.C.B. Dodds.
Brigadier J.R.C. Hamilton.
Brigadier L.L. Wansbrough-Jones.
Lt.Col. M.M. Charteris.
Mr. B.F. Picknett.
Mr. F.C. Rennie.
Air Commodore Brook.
Group Captain V.E.B. Roth.
Mr. P. Garrahan.
Mr. B.A.B. Burrows.
Mr. J.G.S. Beith.
Mr. T.A. Robertson.

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Reference:-

FO 371 / 61960

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TOP SECRET

Church House,
Gt. Smith St.,
London, S.W. 1.

115

My Reference 75872/15A/22

November 14, 1947.

Your Reference

My dear Beith,

I have just seen New York telegram to Foreign Office No. 3355 about Palestine in which our Delegation request guidance on whether it is considered possible or desirable to relinquish the mandate piecemeal so that we should retain our full mandatory authority in such parts of Palestine ~~as which we intend~~ to occupy up to the departure of our last contingents. continued

As you know, this problem has been considered in exchanges of telegrams between us and the High Commissioner arising out of the deliberations of the Official Committee on Palestine. I refer particularly to the High Commissioner's telegram No. 2054, para. 1; our telegram to Palestine No. 2693, para. 6; the High Commissioner's telegram No. 2084, para. 1; our telegram to Palestine No. 2749, para. 3(a); and the High Commissioner's telegram No. 2117, para. 2.

--- I attach a draft telegram to New York compiled from the telegrams I refer to. If you agree with it perhaps you will let me know by telephone and I shall arrange for the copy which I am keeping here to be repeated to Palestine.

Yours ever,
J.G.S. Beith
(J.G.S. Beith)

J.G.S. BEITH, ESQ.

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Reference:-

FO 371 / 61960

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Registry
No.

Top Secret.
Secret.
Confidential.
Restricted.
Open.

Draft.

Sir H. Cadogan,
New York.

Telegram.

No.

(Date)

Repeat to :—

En Clair.

Code.

Cypher.

Distribution :—

Copies to :—

116
F. O.,

194 .

Despatched

M.

Your telegram No. 5355. Palestine.
View at present held here is that
~~It is not considered~~ neither possible nor
desirable to relinquish mandate piecemeal.
As long as civil administration under mandate
is maintained at all the Palestine Government
will remain functionally and territorially
complete, with this proviso, that there might
perforce be some geographical contraction of
the administration from those areas in which
the actions of either or both communities make
its continuation impracticable. The High
Commissioner would not, however, propose to
withdraw civil administration from any area
except in last resort, even at risk of becoming
involved in disturbances, since the probability
is that once one such withdrawal had taken
place it would cause general disturbances
over the rest of Palestine. If we were
forced to relinquish civil control of any
substantial part of Palestine, it would be
better to terminate the civil administration and
the mandate forthwith. When this was done,
/those

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those areas of the country remaining in military
occupation would ~~revert to~~ ^{be controlled by the} military, ~~control~~ ^{where}
~~although the~~ administrative functions ~~of this~~
~~control~~ would be confined to maintaining
only that degree of order and ~~the~~ continued
functioning of essential services necessary
to complete the evacuation of our forces and
stores. For political and legal reasons
it is regarded as essential that the Mandatory
Government should abrogate its authority on
one particular date for the whole of Palestine.

2. This telegram is being repeated to
the High Commissioner for Palestine who ~~is~~ ^{will}
~~no doubt~~ ^{being asked to} let you know if it accurately
reflects his views.

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L 11428

1947

PALESTINE

4 DEC

Registry
Number

FROM

No.

Dated

Received
in Registry

E 11428/9373/31

40 Minute

4 Dec

Brief for Sept conversation with Mr Marshall.

Transmit draft Brief for Sept conversation
with Mr Marshall on Dec 2. re
Palestine.

Last Paper

70986

(Minutes.)

JB Dec 4

References

(Print)

(How disposed of)

(Action
completed)

J E M 1/12

(Index)

3/9/48

Next Paper

11433

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3148 Wt. 26469/137 50m 9/46 (51) F.S.S.

Draft Brief for
Secretary of
State's Conver-
sation with
Mr. Marshall on
December 2nd.

711428

4 DEC

BA 33-1000

10/12/46

Palestine.

Mr. Marshall has already been informed of the outline of our plans for withdrawal from Palestine and of the difficulty which we expect if the United Nations Commission were to arrive in Palestine more than say a fortnight before we were ready to hand over authority to them. This ^date, according to our plan, will be about May 15th.

There has already been some Arab effervescence. Nevertheless, we have received assurances from various Arab spokesmen that they will not try to make trouble while we are still in Palestine. We are now sending to the Arab Governments a message that we expect them to honour these assurances, and suggesting that this will involve not only that they should refrain from armed intervention themselves, but that they should stop individuals from other states crossing into Palestine to provoke disorder, or inciting disturbances from outside.

Our object during this period will be to maintain ^{the} status quo in all respects. This will apply particularly ^{to} immigration. If we modify our policy on this subject this will be an added incentive to the Arabs to take the law into their own hands. We earnestly hope, therefore, that the United States Authorities will feel able to continue and intensify the measures which they have recently begun to take to restrain those involved in organising this traffic. It will also be most helpful ^{if} ~~for~~ the U.S. Authorities could recommend forbearance and moderation to such Jewish representatives/

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END

Mr. Marshall has already been informed of the outline of our plans for withdrawal from Palestine and of the difficulty which we expect if the United Nations Commission were to arrive in Palestine more than say a fortnight before we were ready to hand over authority to them. This date, according to our plan, will be about May 15th.

There has already been some Arab effervescence. Nevertheless, we have received assurances from various Arab spokesmen that they will not try to make trouble while we are still in Palestine. We are now sending to the Arab Governments a message that we expect them to honour these assurances, and suggesting that this will involve not only that they should refrain from armed intervention themselves, but that they should stop individuals from other states crossing into Palestine to provoke disorder, or inciting disturbances from outside.

Our object during this period will be to maintain the status quo in all respects. This will apply particularly to immigration. If we modify our policy on this subject this will be an added incentive to the Arabs to take the law into their own hands. We earnestly hope, therefore, that the United States Authorities will feel able to continue and intensify the measures which they have recently begun to take to restrain those involved in organising this traffic. It will also be most helpful if the United States Authorities could recommend forbearance and moderation to such Jewish representatives with whom they are in contact in the same way as His Majesty's Government have made similar recommendations to Arab representatives.

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